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ABSTRACT: In the 2009-2010 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide if
it matters whether a criminal defense lawyer correctly counsels a client about
the fact that the client faces deportation as a result of a guilty plea. Under
prevailing constitutional norms in almost every jurisdiction, a lawyer does
not have a duty to tell her client about many serious but "collateral"
consequences of a guilty plea. Yet, in every jurisdiction that has considered
the issue, that very same lawyer will run afoul of her duties ifshe
affirmatively misrepresentsa collateralconsequence-every jurisdiction, that
is,
except Kentucky. The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that when
there is no duty to warn about a consequence because it is collateral,
misadvice about that same consequence is not a constitutionalviolation.
The collision of the collateral-consequences rule, which imposes no duty to
warn, and the affirmative-misadviceexception, which imposes a duty to give
accurateadvice where a lawyer chooses to warn, leads to a perverse incentive
structure that signals to defense lawyers (as well as to prosecutors and
judges) that it is safest to say nothing at all about "collateral"matters. The
Kentucky approach that the Supreme Court will review is equally troubling;
it allows false information with no sanction or remedy. A cluttered and
contradictoryjurisprudenceof informationalrights in the guilty-plea process
sits at this intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and affirmativemisadvice exception.
So-called collateralconsequences often overshadow the direct penal sentences
in criminal cases. In addition to deportation, courts categorize many other
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severe consequences as collateral, including involuntary civil commitment,
sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to vote, to obtain professional
licenses, and to receive public housing and benefits. These consequences
touch upon every important area of a convicted person's life-for the rest of
his or her life. They also matter enormously in the United States, which has
more than 600,000 individualsexiting the prison system and millions more
getting criminal records each year. These individuals enter a society that is
struggling to find ways to integrate them despite facing considerable
obstacles.
The constitutionalrule has not caught up to the current reality of the effect
of these consequences on defendants, theirfamilies, and their communities.
The Supreme Court has the opportunity to overcome the mythical divide
between direct and collateral consequences and to protect the constitutional
and ethical values which underlie a defendant's right to decide whether to
plead guilty based on full knowledge of the material consequences. The
Court will consider important issues of professional responsibility, ethics,
transparency, and the right to information in the guilty-plea process. This
Article exposes the problems with the majority and Kentucky approaches. It
argues that only a constitutionalmandate that requires a complete and full
informational disclosure about the serious collateral consequences of guilty
pleas will avoid the problematic incentive structureswe have now.
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INTRODUCTION

Paul Russell was twenty-three years old when he pleaded guilty to
possession of marijuana and to carrying an unlicensed handgun, both
misdemeanors.' He was a lawful permanent resident of the United States,
but remained a citizen of Jamaica. 2 As Russell served his month-long jail
sentence, federal immigration authorities began deportation proceedings
against him. As soon as Russell became aware of this, he moved to withdraw
his guilty pleas.3 Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit granted Russell's motion on the grounds that the
prosecutor had stated incorrectly during the guilty-plea colloquy that a
4
misdemeanor conviction would not make Russell eligible for deportation.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court made a rather disturbing statement:
We reach this holding, of course, because the prosecution chose to
speak [about deportation], and spoke incorrectly. Had the
government stood mute this would be a more difficult case. It is
extremely troublesome that deportation has never been considered
a direct consequence of guilty pleas of the sort that must be
brought to the defendant's attention before his plea may be
considered voluntary under Rule 11.5
Russell was "lucky" to have been misadvised. Although the plea
withdrawal remedy simply put him back in the position of facing all of the
original felony and misdemeanor charges, this time around Russell could
make the decision about whether to plead guilty or go to trial with
knowledge of the deportation consequences. But for a brief remark by the
6
prosecutor, Russell would have been unable to withdraw his guilty pleas.
These two misdemeanor guilty pleas would have subjected him to
7
deportation to a country he had not lived in for nearly a decade.
Jose Padilla was not as lucky, but not because the facts of his case
differed much from those of Russell. Rather, he had the misfortune of
receiving erroneous information about the deportation consequences of his
1. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
2. Id. at 36; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006) ("The term 'lawfully admitted for
permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of
residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant.").
3. Russel 686 F.2d at 37 (noting how Russell moved to withdraw his plea only four days
later).
4. Id. at 41.
5. Id.
6. Id. (quoting the prosecutor as saying during guilty-plea allocution: "We haven't
explored it thoroughly, but it would appear that if Mr. Russell were convicted under the felony
count, marijuana again, that he might be subject to deportation, which would not be the case if
he took the misdemeanor.").
7. Id. at 38 (noting how, under immigration law, "criminal conviction[s] lead[] often,
and sometimes automatically, to deportation" (footnote omitted)).
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guilty plea from his own lawyer in Kentucky. 8 In his case, the Kentucky
Supreme Court recently held a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel is not violated-or even implicated-when his
lawyer advises him incorrectly, so long as the advice pertains to a
consequence that is "collateral" to the actual penal sentence handed down
by the criminal court judge. 9 Since the Kentucky Supreme Court previously
categorized deportation as a collateral event, Padilla's lawyer's incorrect
immigration advice had no effect on the validity of Padilla's guilty plea.
Thus, despite living for decades in the United States and having served in
the military during the Vietnam War, Padilla faced mandatory deportation
for his marijuana-trafficking conviction. 10
Only the U.S. Supreme Court stands between Padilla and his
deportation to Honduras. The Kentucky decision created a split in authority
that persuaded the Supreme Court to hear Padilla's appeal on an important
issue of constitutional informational rights in the guilty-plea context."1 Its
decision will likely have a broad and lasting impact on a number of areas
relating to the consequences of criminal convictions-including client
counseling, guilty-plea allocutions, and plea-bargain negotiationsimplicating both Sixth Amendment effective-assistance-of-counsel and dueprocess standards.
The Russell and Padilla courts' different approaches are both cause for
concern. The Russell court's rule encourages prosecutors, judges, and
defense lawyers to remain silent about the existence or severity of collateral
consequences, lest they give incorrect information and thereby undermine
the finality of the guilty plea or risk being branded an ineffective attorney.
The opinion in Padilla, on the other hand, effectively permits a defense
lawyer to "induce his or her client to plead guilty through deception or

8.

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317

(2009).
9.

Id. at 485.

10.
See id. (reinstating Padilla's conviction); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Padilla v.
Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008), 2008 WL 4933628, at *i ("[B]ecause the offense was
an aggravated felony, Petitioner's deportation is mandatory."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43)
(2006) (defining "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance" to be an aggravated felony); id.
§ 1227(a) (2) (B) (i) (including marijuana trafficking on list of deportable drug offenses); id.
§ 1229b(a) (3) (excluding aggravated felonies from the extremely limited list of convictions that
might qualify for discretionary relief from deportation from the Attorney General); 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(c)(c)(10), (17) (listing marihuana and tetrahydrocannabinols as Schedule I controlled
substances).
11.
Padilla,253 S.W.3d 482. Padilla was originally given a split sentence of five years prison
followed by five years probation. Id. at 483. He has finished serving the prison term, and his
deportation has been stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision. Telephone Interview by
Erin Creaghe with Richard Neal, Attorney for Jose Padilla, in Louisville, Ky. (Feb. 20, 2009).
The Court heard oral arguments on October 13, 2009. Adam Liptak, Justices Seem Sympathetic to
Defendant Given Bad Legal Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at A18, available at http://wwvw.
nytimes.com/2009/10/14/us/14scoms.html?_=l&sq=padilla.
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outright incompetence related to a 'collateral' matter without undermining
12
the validity of the plea."
This perverse incentive structure should lead the Supreme Court to
reject the approaches of both courts. Instead, the Court should formally
acknowledge the existence of evolving professional norms, which in recent
years have developed into a more robust, affirmative duty to warn
defendants about collateral consequences in criminal cases. 13 Effectiveassistance-of-counsel jurisprudence gauges attorney competence against
prevailing professional norms, 14 and it is time for the constitutional
jurisprudence to catch up to these heightened standards. The Court should
reject the artificial, ill-conceived divide between collateral and direct
consequences and find that only a rule of full information about any severe
consequences of a criminal conviction can adequately protect the
constitutional values surrounding guilty pleas, including the right to an
informed, voluntary process and the assistance of an effective lawyer.
This divide is rooted in the so-called "collateral consequences" rule.
Lower federal and state courts have created this rule, stating that an
individual's guilty plea is constitutionally valid even if that person was
unaware of his conviction's "collateral" consequences. In other words, the
individual pleading guilty need only be informed about the "direct," or
penal, sanctions-such as jail or prison time, probationary period or a finewhich will result from the conviction. 15 Courts have labeled many
consequences "collateral," including deportation, sex-offender registration,
post-sentence involuntary civil commitment as a "sexually violent predator,"
the loss of voting rights, and the loss of housing and employment
opportunities. 16 A defendant's right to know about such consequences, and
12. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at*15.
13. See infta Part III.B.4 (pointing out how professional standards have taken greater
account of the growing effects of collateral consequences of criminal convictions but still fall
short with respect to making the duty to inform enforceable).
14. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the Sixth Amendment
and the standards it imposes on attorneys).
15. Courts use several different tests for distinguishing between direct and collateral
consequences. SeeJenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators,"93 MINN. L. REV. 670,
689-93 (2008) (describing and critiquing the three main tests and listing cases relying upon
them). The prevailing definition of "direct consequence" comes from the Fourth Circuit. See
Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) ("The distinction between
'direct' and 'collateral' consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in the relevant
decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic
effect on the range of the defendant's punishment."). This Article, for the limited purpose of
comparing silence to misadvice, does not accept but rather works within this framework. Thus,
this Article's use of the convenient term "collateral consequence" simply means the
consequences that most courts have categorized as collateral.
16.

See, e.g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (deeming revocation

of driver's license collateral); Waddy v. Davis, 445 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[L]oss of franchise
is a result of the conviction, not the plea."); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 438 (D. Mass. 1996)
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thus to have the full picture about what will or may occur as a result of any
guilty plea, is consistent with our criminal justice system's concerns with
fairness, transparency, voluntariness, and proportionality. Yet almost all
jurisdictions that have considered the issue have found that courts do not
have a constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant is aware of the
collateral consequences attached to a guilty plea-many of which are
severe. 17 What is more, courts have also found that neither due-process nor
effective-assistance-of-counsel norms require defense counsel to warn the
defendant of collateral consequences. 18 Therefore, courts do not allow
defendants to withdraw their guilty plea because their counsel failed to warn
them about such consequences. 19 Under the collateral-consequences rule,
silence about many severe but non-penal consequences is widely accepted.
Yet many collateral consequences are as serious as, or even overshadow, the
penal sanction. If informed about serious collateral consequences,
defendants would certainly take them into account in deciding whether to
enter a guilty plea.
In Russell, and in almost every state and federal jurisdiction that has
considered a case involving misadvice, there is another layer to the thorny
ethics and incentive issues posed by the collateral-consequences rule. These
courts all adhere to an "affirmative misadvice" or "misrepresentation"
exception to the rule: while silence is permissible, if the court, defense
counsel, or prosecution tries to warn about the same consequence yet
provides the defendant with erroneous information, the plea will violate
due-process standards which require that defendants knowingly and

("[E] ntering the guilty plea without knowledge of the potential for [sex-offender] registration
and community notification does not render his plea involuntary and, thus, does not violate the

Constitution.").
17. See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that "the possibility
of commitment for life as a sexually dangerous person is a collateral consequence of pleading
guilty"); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) ("Each federal circuit that has directly
considered the issue has held that deportation is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty so
that the trial court is not required to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences of
his or her plea.").
18.

See, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[Dleportation

remains a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction, and counsel's failure to advise a
criminal defendant of its possibility does not result in a Sixth Amendment deprivation.").
19. See, e.g., Steele, 365 F.3d at 16. Consideration of the collateral-consequences rule
generally arises in the context of guilty pleas, when a defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea
based on a lack of information about a consequence. However, the right to information also
applies when a defendant rejects a plea-bargain offer or the opportunity to plead guilty to the
charges against him. Here, the relevant consideration would be the defendant's right to be
aware of the potential consequences he would face should he be convicted after trial. See
generally Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding ineffective assistance of
counsel where lawyer failed to counsel defendant "that, although he never even suggested such
a thought to [his client], it was [defense counsel's] own view that his client's decision to reject
the plea bargain was suicidal" (footnote omitted)).
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voluntarily enter guilty pleas. 20 If the misrepresentation comes from defense
counsel, it may also constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment's
effective-assistance-of-counsel
guarantee. 21 The
affirmative-misadvice
exception "is apparently the rule in every Federal circuit, the District of
22
Columbia, and twenty-one states."
Taken together, the collateral-consequences rule and its affirmativemisadvice exception send a troubling message to parties involved in the
guilty-plea process: it is better to say nothing to a defendant about
consequences that are "collateral" to a conviction than to attempt to provide
information and risk being wrong. Most state and federal courts that have
examined the issue agree there is no right to a warning about any collateral
consequence, effectively placing a constitutional stamp of approval on
silence. Under this rubric, an individual who must decide whether to plead
guilty or proceed to trial never receives information that is often central to
his decision.
There are some court rules, professional standards, and ethical codes
that require warnings about at least some collateral consequences. 23 Yet
while these and other factors can influence criminal-justice-system actors to
warn defendants about some of the more serious collateral consequences,
the prevailing constitutional bottom line is that guilty pleas are immune
from attack if a defendant remains ignorant of the collateral consequences.
This scenario is worrisome, especially at a time when the United States
finds itself dealing with the enormous and complex issues related to the
annual reentry of 600,000 former prisoners into society.24 These individuals'

20. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XWV; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970) (applying due-process norms to guilty pleas).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985) (applying
right-to-counsel norms to guilty pleas). While erroneous information may lead to an invalid
plea under due-process principles, an ineffective-assistance claim requires that a defendant
show both incompetent lawyering (the erroneous advice) and prejudice (a demonstration that,
without the erroneous advice, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
chosen to go to trial rather than pleading guilty). Id.
22. Petition for a Writ ofCertiorari, supra note 10, at *13. The Petition further noted that
between 1979 and 2008:
[A]II
jurisdictions that have considered the question have also concluded that even
though the subject was a "collateral" matter for which the defendant was not
entitled to representation-such as deportation, parole eligibility, suspension of
driving privileges, etc.-flagrant misadvice by counsel may constitute ineffective
assistance which renders the plea involuntary.
Id. at *12 (footnote omitted).
23. See infta Part III.B (discussing these non-constitutional sources of regulation).
24.

See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 3 (2003) ("One of the most

profound challenges facing American society is the reintegration of more than 600,000 adultsabout 1,600 a day-who leave state and federal prisons and return home each year."); see also
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAI'ERS 81
(Jan. 20, 2004). President Bush stated:
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criminal records will affect them, their families, and their communities at
large in ways that many surely never imagined when they were convicted.
The same consequences apply to the millions of men and women who
receive criminal convictions each year but spend no actual time in prison.
Most convicted individuals and former prisoners will find it difficult to get
work because of either formal statutory or regulatory bars on hiring
individuals with criminal records 25 or the stigma associated even with nonviolent convictions. 26 They will struggle to find housing and to get an
education.27 If the person has a sexual-offense conviction, the post-sentence
consequences will affect every facet of his life, ranging from the possibility of
lifelong involuntary civil commitment in a prison or prison-like facility28 to

[T] onight I propose a 4-year, $300 million prisoner reentry initiative to expand job
training and placement services, to provide transitional housing, and to help newly
released prisoners get mentoring, including from faith-based groups. America is
the land of second chance, and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead
should lead to a better life.
Id. at 88.
25.
See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 250.006 (Vernon 2007) (listing numerous
criminal convictions that are a permanent or five-year bar to employment in facilities serving
the elderly, disabled, or terminally ill).
26.
See Devah Pager, The Mark of a CriminalRecord, 108 AM.J. Soc. 937, 956 (2003) (noting
how employers often use an applicant's criminal record as a screening mechanism). The use of
criminal records has become such a bar to employment that some jurisdictions have adopted
"ban the box" initiatives, under which applicants for government jobs no longer have to fill in a
box asking if they have been convicted of a crime. Minnesota recently enacted such a statute,
under which most public employers "may not inquire into or consider the criminal record or
criminal history of an applicant ... until the applicant has been selected for an interview."
Omnibus Public Safety Policy Bill, ch. 59, art. 5, § 11, 2009 Minn. Sess. Laws Serv. 278, 297
(West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 364.021). However, an agency will still conduct a
background check on any person offered a job and any statutory bars to employment will
remain in effect. Id. These initiatives recognize the discrimination that individuals with criminal
records face in simply getting an initial interview. See Gene C.Johnson, 'Ban The Box'Movement
Gains Steam, L.A. WAVE, Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/
(describing "ban the box"
view article.html?article-id=99ce5ed2c12c489351589891334e720f
rules in Los Angeles County and in the cities of Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco).
27. For example, a plea to simple drug possession results in ineligibility for, or
termination of, federal student loans, see 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2003) (varying ineligibility
periods based on number of convictions), most public housing, see 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2003),
and public benefits in most states, see 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2003).
28. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(c) (2005 & Supp. 2007) (describing how
individuals subject to the "Sexually Violent Predator Act" can be confined by the Secretary of
Corrections so long as they are "housed and managed separately from offenders in the custody
of the secretary of corrections, and except for occasional instances of supervised incidental
contact, [are] segregated from such offenders").
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Internet postings of his photo, address, and workplace 29 to local laws that
30
restrict where sex offenders may live and work.
It is not necessarily the case that misadvice about deportation made Mr.
Russell's or Mr. Padilla's pleas less voluntary, knowing, or intelligent than a
total lack of advice. It is quite easy to imagine that in either scenario-no
warning, or an erroneous lulling of their concerns-Mr. Russell or Mr.
Padilla would have made a different decision about whether to plead guilty
had they known that the plea could be the basis for deportation. The
amount of information that someone in Mr. Russell's or Mr. Padilla's
position ultimately gets from the judge, defense counsel, and prosecutor
may well be determined by the potential effects the rules have on the
behavior of these relevant actors in the criminal justice system. All of these
actors might offer-or fail, intentionally or otherwise, to offer-advice on
the issue. The actor most likely to be in this position is, of course, the
defense attorney, with her constitutional duty to counsel her client about the
merits and drawbacks of any plea offered. 31
Defense counsel owes a constitutional duty of effective assistance to a
client considering whether to enter a guilty plea. 32 This duty would be
meaningless if the attorney's counseling about the pros and cons of a plea

29. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, Public Sex Offender Registry, https://records.
txdps.state.tx.us/DPSWEB/SorNew/PublicSite/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (listing
both home and work addresses of registered sex offenders in Texas).
30. See, e.g., Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A22
(describing how local laws restricting where convicted sex offenders may live forced five men to
live under a bridge and how they "must stay at the bridge from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. because a
parole officer checks on them nearly every night").
31. See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1996); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not
to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 847-48 (1998)
(noting how Boria "held that the Constitution requires that defense counsel provide an
informed opinion on whether to plead guilty or go to trial"); see also In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d
1171, 1178 (Cal. 2001). In Resendiz, the court stated:
We recognize that it is the attorney, not the client, who is particularly qualified to
make an informed evaluation of a proffered plea bargain. Thus, ... [t]he
defendant can be expected to rely on counsel's independent evaluation of the
charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of the risks and probable outcome of
trial.
Id. (quoting In reAlvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 753 (Cal. 1992)).
The trial court will also be involved, but in a much more limited role as judge of the
voluntariness of any guilty plea as well as a potential conduit for information about collateral
consequences, should that discussion happen in open court. The prosecutor might be involved,
but only if there is discussion in open court or in the less likely event that she offers information
about collateral consequences directly to a pro se defendant during plea negotiations.
32. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) ("Where ... a defendant is represented by
counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970))).
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versus a trial did not have meaningful content. It is beyond dispute that
counsel must ensure that her client understands the maximum criminal
penalty that he will face if convicted. 33 Courts recognize that individuals
cannot make an intelligent and voluntary decision about pleading guilty
without information about the potential consequences of the plea, and they
also recognize that people need the assistance of a trained professional to
34
understand such information.
This reasoning behind the constitutional recognition of the need for
counseling about the penal consequences of a criminal conviction also
applies to many collateral consequences. This is particularly true of both
serious collateral consequences (such as deportation 35 or civil commitment)
and collateral consequences that overshadow any criminal penalty on a case
(such as loss of public housing or a professional license for a misdemeanor
conviction that carried no jail time). Surely the cost of a serious collateral
consequence is one that any reasonable person would carefully weigh
against any benefits of a negotiated settlement when deciding whether to
plead or go to trial. The lower courts' majority approach to this issue fails to
recognize the critical nature of this aspect of counseling content.
This Article builds on a previous article, which proposed a
reasonableness test to determine when courts should require warnings about
a particular consequence under a due-process analysis. Thus, a defendant
would have the right to receive "warnings whenever a reasonable person in
the defendant's situation would deem knowledge of th [at] consequence,
penal or otherwise, to be a significant factor in deciding whether to plead
guilty."13 6 The proposed two-part test for determining the "significance" of a
consequence considered: (1) the severity of the consequence, and (2) the
likelihood that the consequence would apply to the defendant. Under the
primary factor of severity, "[i]f reasonable people would treat as significant a

33. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining the different definitions used for
distinguishing between "direct" and "collateral" consequences); see also Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970) (discussing how Brady was advised by competent counsel as to
possible penalties based on existing law).
34. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.... He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.").
35. In 1997, Congress renamed proceedings to expel an illegal immigrant from the
country, changing "deportation" to "removal" in federal immigration law. Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 § 308, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). This Article relies on the
older, more descriptive, and widely understood term. See Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the
Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers,35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 164, 166
n.7 (2008) ("By replacing a word ('deport') that requires a human object with another
('remove') that is usually applied to an inanimate object, Congress opted for sanitizing
language that embodies an attitude toward unauthorized migration fully consistent with
rhetoric that describes unauthorized immigrants as 'illegal.'").
36. Roberts, supra note 15, at 674.
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severe consequence when making a decision as serious as a guilty plea,
courts should require pre-plea warnings before concluding that the plea is
'knowing."' 3 7 Under the secondary factor of likelihood, even where the
"consequence is not at the highest end of the severity scale, warnings would
still be mandatory when the mere fact of the criminal conviction makes it
certain that the consequence would apply." 38 This is because "i]t is
reasonable to require warnings about the limited number of such
39
automatically applicable consequences."
The first article concentrated on a due-process analysis. This Article
takes the next step and focuses on defense counsel's duties under the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. It explores how
the intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and the affirmativemisrepresentation exception affects counsel's behavior, and thus affects the
flow of information to a defendant pleading guilty. The two factors from the
proposed due-process test-severity of the consequence and likelihood of its
application-are relevant to both prongs of the U.S. Supreme Court's
existing structure for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims: reasonable
attorney competence and prejudice to the defendant. 40 Under a proper
Sixth Amendment analysis, defense counsel would have an affirmative duty
to warn about severe consequences, such as civil commitment, because it
would be unreasonable to fail to warn about matters of such central
importance in a defendant's decision-making process. Counsel would also
have a duty to warn defendants about consequences such as mandatory
deportation or non-discretionary, automatic, lifetime sex-offender
registration based on the particular conviction because the list of these
consequences is limited and manageable. The prejudice prong, which
requires a defendant who pleaded guilty to show a reasonable probability
that without the incompetent attorney behavior he would have chosen trial
over a plea, 41 would be relevant to consequences that are serious or likely,
yet perhaps not on the far end of the severity or certainty spectra. For
example, the likely loss of a professional license as a consequence of a
conviction would require a court to consider whether under the particular
facts and circumstances of the defendant's employment history and strength
of the criminal case, it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have
declined to plead guilty had he known of the potential loss of the license.
Part II of this Article explores the current constitutional distinction in
the lower courts between affirmative misrepresentations and the total failure
37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39. Id. at 674-75.
40. See supra note 21 and infra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court's two-prong ineffective-assistance-of-counseI test).
41.
See supra note 21 (describing the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel test).
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to warn. It also points out problems of interpretation and implementation
that courts are likely to encounter should the dichotomy stand. Part III
advances the central claim of this Article. It focuses on the current rule's
disturbing incentive structure, which excuses a total failure to warn
defendants about collateral consequences yet carves out an exception for
misadvice. Part III also discusses how non-constitutional regulation, such as
court rules and professional standards, may require such warnings.
Ultimately, it concludes that while such regulation, standing alone,
constitutes a weak influence over information-sharing behavior in the guiltyplea context, it would be meaningful if incorporated into Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part 1V explores the potential rationales underlying the
current constitutional rules and concludes that they do not outweigh the
high costs, identified in Part III, at the intersection of the rule and
exception. Part IV also critiques the doctrinal soundness of a rule that
distinguishes between silence and misadvice.
II. FLAWED EXCEPTION TO THE FLAWED COLLATERAL-CONSEQUENCES
RULE: AFFIRMATIVE MISADVICE

The constitutional law behind the collateral-consequences rule and
affirmative-misadvice exception is rooted in the jurisprudence governing
guilty pleas, which encompasses both the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel and the due-process right to a knowing and
voluntary plea. While the doctrinal origins of the collateral-consequences
rule are questionable, 42 it is the majority approach to both a court's and
defense counsel's duty to warn. This Part briefly explores the state and lower
federal courts' reliance on the rule and exception.
A.

FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS ADHERE 7

THE

COLLA TERAL-CONSEQUENCES RuLE

Almost all jurisdictions follow the collateral-consequences rule, even in
situations involving the harshest consequences that can flow from a
conviction. For example, in twenty states a court can involuntarily commit
an individual to a secure facility as a "sexually violent predator" after he
completes his prison sentence. 43 Despite the extreme liberty deprivation at
stake, and the fact that commitment can last for the remainder of the
individual's life, courts have deemed the consequence collateral and have

42. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 684-89 (questioning the lower federal and state courts'
reliance upon Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in fashioning the collateral
consequences doctrine).
43. See Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices,
Characteristics,and Resident Demographics,36J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 439, 441-43 (2008).

95 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[20091

thus held there is no constitutional right to know about it prior to pleading
guilty.

44

The same holds true for the severe consequence of deportation. As one
court recently noted, "Each federal circuit that has directly considered the
issue has held that deportation is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty
so that the trial court is not required to inform the defendant of the
immigration consequences of his or her plea." 45 In addition, most of the
state high courts that have considered the collateral-consequences rule have
accepted it. 46 There are exceptions. The most notable example is the New
Mexico Supreme Court, which recently held as a matter of federal
constitutional law that defense lawyers must warn their clients about the
47
immigration consequences of any guilty plea.
The United States Supreme Court has never decided, as a matter of
either due process or effective assistance of counsel, whether a defendant
has a right to information about particular collateral consequences prior to
entering a

plea of guilty. 48

The

doctrinal

development of the collateral-consequences

basis for

the lower courts'

rule, however, resides in the

Supreme Court case of Brady v. United States. The issue of the right to pre-

44. See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant
does not need to be informed that he might be involuntarily committed for life, as a "sexually
dangerous person," following release from prison).
45. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) (citation omitted) (citing cases from
numerous Circuit Courts of Appeal finding deportation to be a collateral consequence).
Although there are various court and ethical rules and professional standards which may
require or recommend advisement about certain consequences (usually immigration), in most
jurisdictions no one is constitutionally obligated to give a defendant this critical informationnot the court, prosecutor, nor even defense counsel. Consequently, there is no uniformity in
the distribution of information about collateral consequences to defendants. See infra Parts
II.B.2-5 (discussing such rules and standards).
46. See Brief of Amici Curiae Criminal and Immigration Law Professors, Capital Area
Immigrants' Rights Coalition, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban
Affairs, and Western Kentucky Refugee Mutual Assistance Society, Inc. in Support of Petitioner
at 11-12, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009), 2009 WL 164242 [hereinafter
Padilla Amici Cert. Petition] (noting how, under federal constitutional rulings, "[t]en federal
circuits and seventeen states hold that defense lawyers are under no obligation" to warn clients
about deportation prior to a guilty plea and how three state courts have come to the opposite
conclusion, also applying federal constitutional norms).
47. See State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004); see also People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d
523, 529 (Colo. 1987) ("When defense counsel in a criminal case is aware that his client is an
alien, he may reasonably be required to investigate relevant immigration law." (citing People v.
Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1481-82 (1987))); Padilla Amici Cert. Petition, supra note 46, at
12 (listing Paredez,Pozo and an Ohio intermediate appellate court in stating that "[t]hree courts
...have recognized that, to render effective assistance of counsel, criminal defense lawyers
must advise at least some noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of a conviction");
infta notes 99-104, 226-38 and accompanying text (discussing Paredez).
48. See Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that there is no Supreme
Court precedent establishing that defense counsel provides ineffective assistance for failing to
warn a client about the consequence of parole ineligibility).
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plea information--either about collateral consequences or involving
affirmative misrepresentation-was not before the Brady Court. The Court
did, however, agree with the Fifth Circuit, which stated that a guilty plea was
voluntary when, among other things, it was "'entered by one fully aware of
the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.'" 49 The lower
courts have latched onto this dictum to support their use of a bright line
between direct and collateral consequences in both due-process and
50
effective-assistance jurisprudence.
In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court noted how "Even if the defendant were not
initially aware of [the federal statute governing relief from deportation],
competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice
51
guides, would have advised him concerning the provision's importance."
Although this more recent Supreme Court dictum has not led the lower
federal or state courts to find a duty to warn, 52 the Court could settle the
issue of whether defense counsel has an affirmative, constitutional
obligation to warn his or her clients about collateral consequences when it
issues a decision in Padillav. Kentucky during the 2009-2010 term. 53 It could
limit its decision to the narrow consideration of the affirmative-misadvice
exception, and whether the Kentucky Supreme Court was correct to deny
such an exception. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court's Padilladecision
relied significantly on its own ruling in an earlier case that accepted the
collateral-consequences rule. 54 Therefore, it is difficult to disaggregate the
rule and exception, both in Padillaand when considering the rationales for

49.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242
F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957)); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 706 (2002)

(citing Brady for the proposition that "[t]he Supreme Court created the rule that the Due
Process Clause requires the trial court to explain only the direct consequences of conviction"
(citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 755)).
50.

See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Brady in stating that

"a defendant need only be 'fully aware of the direct consequences"' of a guilty plea (quoting
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755)). But see Roberts, supra note 15, at 684-89 (critiquing lower federal and
state courts' use of Brady's dictum on direct consequences for development of the collateralconsequences rule).
51.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001).
52.

See, e.g., State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 937-38 (Utah 2005) ("The practice

standards [on counseling clients about deportation consequences] referenced by the Supreme
Court were not accompanied by any language that would suggest that it was the Court's
intention to cloak these practice guidelines in constitutional garb.").
53. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's recent
grant of certiorari in Padilla).
54. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483-84 (Ky. 2008) (citing Commonwealth
v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005)) (finding lawyer's inaccurate advice to client regarding
effect of guilty plea on immigration status to be a collateral consequence and therefore outside
the scope of Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel protection), cert. granted, 129 S. CL 1317 (2009);
see also infra notes 202-20.
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such an exception in general. In addition, as explored in Part III, the vexing
incentives which flow from both the rule and the exception militate in favor
of the Court's full consideration of the doctrine.
B.

FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS ADHERE TO THE
AFFIRMATIVE-MJISADVICE EXCEPTION

A number of state and federal circuit courts have articulated an
affirmative-misadvice or -misrepresentation exception to the general rule
barring withdrawal of guilty pleas due to a lack of warning about a collateral
consequence. These courts have applied the exception to both of the
constitutional claims raised regarding the validity of a guilty plea: due55
process violations and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
The Russell decision discussed in the Introduction illustrates the typical
reasoning and outcome in a due-process claim, where affirmative misadvice
opens the door for the remedy of plea withdrawal. 56 As for ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims, the Florida District Court's approach to silence
and misinformation in Roberti v. State illustrates the typical reasoning and
outcome when courts consider claims of violations of the Sixth Amendment
effective-assistance-of-counsel requirement. Ronald Roberti pleaded "no
contest," was convicted of various sexual offenses, and was sentenced to
prison followed by probation. 57 Later seeking to withdraw that plea, Roberti
alleged that his lawyer had told him that, because he would serve his
58
probation out of state, he would not be subject to Florida's Ryce Act.
Under the Ryce Act, a reviewing judge must civilly commit any person found
to be a "sexually violent predator," "until such time as the person's mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that it is safe for the
person to be at large." 59 An individual's sexual-offense conviction is a critical

55. See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that "an
affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is
today objectively unreasonable" and thus "meets the first prong of the Strickland test"); ElNobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Because the government did not
misrepresent to petitioner the consequences of his plea, petitioner cannot show that his plea
was involuntary and unknowing.").
56. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing Russell).
57. Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). A noto contendere plea,
also known as a "no contest" plea, has the same force and effect as a guilty plea for the purposes
of having a conviction and serving a sentence; the only difference is that such a plea allows the
defendant to neither admit nor deny the charges. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36
n.8 (1970).
58. See Roberti, 782 So. 2d at 920.
59. FiA. STAT. § 394.917(2) (2006) (stating that civil confinement begins after
"incarcerative portion of all criminal sentences"); see also id.§ 394.912(9) (listing qualifying
offenses). The Ryce Act defines "convicted of a sexually violent offense" to include, among
other things, both guilty and nolo contendere pleas. Id. § 394.912(2).
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element in any Ryce Act determination, 60 and thus Roberti's guilty plea put
him at risk of civil commitment. As the appellate court later noted, Roberti's
counsel's alleged misadvice "is an incorrect statement of the law," since the
Ryce Act applies to all individuals sentenced to prison. 6 1
The Roberti court found that civil commitment is a collateral
consequence. 62 However, this was not the end of the analysis. The court
went on to hold that Roberti's claim fell under the rule that "[a]ffirmative
misadvice about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which to withdraw
the plea." 63 The court analyzed the affirmative-misrepresentation exception
to the collateral-consequences rule under the two-prong test for ineffective
assistance of counsel. This test requires a defendant seeking to reverse a
conviction or withdraw a guilty plea to show both deficient defense-counsel
performance and prejudice. 64 For example, had Roberti's defense counsel
simply failed to say anything at all about potential lifelong civil commitment,
Roberti would not have won a hearing on his attempt to prove that he
suffered prejudice as a result of incorrect advice and that the court should
thus allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. 65 In short, Roberti "benefited"
from the fact that his lawyer gave him incorrect advice. 66

60.
Id. § 394.912(9) (listing two requirements for determination that someone is a
"sexually violent predator," one of which is a conviction for an enumerated "sexually violent
offense").
61.
Roberti, 782 So. 2d at 920; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.925.
62.
Roberti, 782 So. 2d at 920. Three years after the Roberti decision, the Florida Supreme
Court agreed. See State v. Harris, 881 So. 2d 1079, 1083-84 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting argument that
possibility of involuntary civil commitment under the Ryce Act violated the express terms of a
plea bargain which failed to mention civil commitment).
63.
Roberti, 782 So. 2d at 920 (citations omitted).
64.
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (finding the Strickland test applicable in
guilty-plea context); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (announcing the twoprong ineffective-assistance test).
65.
See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ("[I]n order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." (footnote omitted));
Roberti, 782 So. 2d at 920 (stating that to fulfill the prejudice requirement, "the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"). A prejudice-prong analysis is hard
enough to apply in a typical claim of ineffectiveness in the guilty-plea context, where a court
must decide, ex post facto, if some piece of information would have made a difference in a trial
that never happened. The Hillcourt explained:
[T]he determination whether the error "prejudiced" the defendant by causing him
to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery
of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the
plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether
the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.
Hill 474 U.S. at 59. To build on one of Hilts examples, if counsel failed to investigate a
potential alibi defense before the client pleaded guilty, any post-conviction reviewing court
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A number of decisions applying the affirmative-misadvice exception
illustrate how much disagreement there is over its actual application to case
facts. For example, some courts have applied a per se attorney-incompetency
finding to misrepresentations about deportation. The Second Circuit
recently held that "an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to the
deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively

would have to determine whether the alibi evidence would have made a difference given the
evidence that the prosecution might have put forth had there been a trial.
Such an analysis does not even apply when the ineffectiveness claim relates to
misadvice about a collateral consequence. For example, civil commitment would certainly
factor largely into a person's decision about whether to plead guilty, but it is not information
that would be evidence at a trial. Thus, it would not lend itself to a determination of whether
counsel would have changed his recommendation about the plea due to a prediction that the
trial outcome would have been different. Courts could attempt to examine the strength of the
evidence that was never admitted in a trial in order to discern whether the person weighing the
pros and cons of a plea versus a trial would have still pleaded guilty with correct information
about the collateral consequence in the equation. However, this would lead to an even more
convoluted inquiry than that which now exists in a non-collateral-consequences case. Instead,
courts should simply determine whether the defendant credibly demonstrated that he would
have taken his chances at trial had he known about, say, the mandatory deportation
consequences of his guilty plea. See, e.g., People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 334 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (describing Defendant's affidavit, which stated that his attorney specifically advised
him that his guilty plea would neither prevent him from obtaining citizenship nor lead to his
deportation: "Based on these assurances, I entered my plea of guilty.... Had I known that I was
exposing myself to deportation by pleading guilty, I would never have entered such plea.").
66. Obviously, Roberti would have benefited more from correct advice the first time
around. However, given the post-conviction position that he was in, misadvice gave him an
evidentiary hearing where silence would not. In any case, according to the electronic docket of
the Manatee County Clerk of Circuit Court, the court denied Roberti's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea on remand. Denial of Motion for Evidentiary to Show Defendant Was Misadvised,
Roberti, 782 So. 2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (No. 168). According to the Florida
Department of Corrections, Roberti remained incarcerated until his death in custody on
February 2, 2009. Fla. Dep't of Corrs., Inmate Release Information Search, http://www.dc.state.
fl.us/lnmateReleases/search.asp (enter "Roberti" into the "Last Name" field, enter "Ronald"
into the "First Name" field, enter "S06276" into the "DC Number" field, and click "Submit
Request") (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
The affirmative-misrepresentation exception to the collateral-consequences rule is not
unique to the Ryce Act (sexually violent predator) context in Florida. Various lower Florida
state-court decisions have also applied it with respect to the consequences of potential
deportation, citizenship applications, sentence enhancements and the right to vote. See Alguno
v. State, 892 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Florida cases addressing
affirmative misrepresentations about these consequences). In addition, the affirmativemisrepresentation exception applies to prosecutors and judges as well as defense lawyers, since
guilty pleas based on misinformation violate the due process knowledge and voluntariness
standards. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that, since
the "record on appeal makes it clear that the prosecution made misrepresentations concerning
the deportation consequences of the defendant's plea ... , we must vacate the defendant's
guilty plea"); United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Calculations of
the likelihood of deportation may thus rightly be included in the judgment as to whether an
accused should plead guilty, and any actions by Government counsel that create a
misapprehension as to that likelihood may undercut the voluntariness of the plea.").
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unreasonable." 67 Other courts complicate this determination under
Stricklands attorney-competence prong, distinguishing between a defense
lawyer's "patently erroneous" advice and simple "competent, good faith
advice which later turn[ed] out to be incorrect," 68 or requiring a defendant
to demonstrate that his "attorney blatantly misstate [d]" a consequence of a
69
conviction.
One recent ineffective-assistance analysis illustrates the struggles that
courts have had, on the same set of facts, in determining whether there was
affirmative misadvice or simply a total lack of advice. Before Paul Sambursky
pleaded guilty to multiple felony charges, he asked his lawyer "'if there was
[sic] any statutes, rules, regulations, or policies that govern parole."' 70 The
lawyer called the parole board and reported back to his client that "'there
were no parolee rights,"' that "'everything the [Parole Board] do[es] is
discretionary,"' and that "'people that have been convicted of a crime do not
have any hard and fast policy rights."' 71 In fact, state law made Mr.
Sambursky ineligible for parole until he served eighty-five percent of his
sentence. 72 The North Dakota state courts that reviewed his application to
withdraw his guilty plea based on affirmative misadvice regarding his parole
eligibility found that "while counsel had failed to inform Sambursky of the
85%
minimum
service
requirement,
there
was
no
'active
misrepresentation."' 73
The reviewing federal court found "troublesome questions" in deciding
whether counsel's response to Sambursky's parole inquiries qualified as
affirmative misadvice. 74 "This is because [counsel's] response could have
different meanings depending upon the context." 75 While the federal court

67.

United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002).

68.
69.

Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1539 n.l (11th Cir. 1985).
Yordan v. Dugger, 909 F.2d 474, 478 (1 1th Cir. 1990); see also Goodall v. United States,

759 A.2d 1077, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that "representation is constitutionally
deficient if counsel provides materia/!y erroneous information regarding the parole consequences
of a plea, and the defendant relies upon it" (emphasis added)). There are other difficulties with
administration of the exception, such as the evidence required to demonstrate misadvice. At
least one court would require trial counsel to sign an affidavit admitting to having given his
client incorrect advice. Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1538 n.8 (citing United States v. Santelises,
476 F.2d 787, 790 n.3 (2d Cir. 1973)). This means that trial counsel would have to admit
malpractice, or at least some elements of that tort. See infra Part III.B.7 (discussing obstacles to
successful malpractice claims against criminal defense lawyers). Such a requirement is especially
problematic in a jurisdiction that distinguishes between "good faith" and "patently erroneous"
advice where counsel would have to swear to providing patently erroneous advice.
70. Sambursky v. Schuetzle, No. 1:08-cv-068, 2009 WL 1259214, at *13 (D.N.D. May 1,
2009).
71.
Id.
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id. at *5.
74. Id. at *10.
75. Sambursky, 2009 WL 1259214, at *12.
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denied Sambursky's Sixth Amendment claim based on his failure to
adequately demonstrate prejudice, 76 the other courts' varying analyses show
some practical problems of interpretation that arise during the application
of the affirmative-misadvice exception.
The Supreme Court has not weighed in to clarify whether affirmative
misadvice about a collateral consequence can lead to an invalid guilty plea.
It came close, however, in Hill v. Lockhart.77 William Lloyd Hill claimed that

his attorney was ineffective because he provided incorrect information to
Hill about his parole eligibility. 78 The case is best known for establishing the
principle that the Court's two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial also applies in the guilty-plea context. 79 Under the first
prong, Hill had to show that his attorney's representation fell below
accepted norms of defense-counsel competence by telling him that he was
eligible for parole after serving one-third, rather than one-half, of his prison
sentence. 80 The Court, however, never reached this issue. Nor did it
consider whether parole eligibility qualified as a direct or collateral
consequence, or even if courts should follow such a direct-collateral
categorization scheme when applying the two-prong Strickland-Hill
analysis. 8' Instead, the Court found it "unnecessary to determine whether
there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice by counsel as to
parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel because in the present case we conclude that petitioner's allegations
are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of
'prejudice.' 82

76. Id. at *5.
77. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
78. Id. at 54-55 (noting that "[a]ccording to petitioner, his attorney had told him that if
he pleaded guilty he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his prison
sentence," when "[i]n fact, because petitioner previously had been convicted of a felony in
Florida, he was classified under Arkansas law as a 'second offender' and was required to serve
one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole").
79. Id. at 58.
80. Id.at 56 (citing McMann v.Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970), for the proposition
that prong one of Strickland asks whether the advice at issue was "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases").
81. In the Eighth Circuit's opinion below in Hill, the court did find that "[t]he details of
parole eligibility are considered collateral rather than direct consequences of a plea, of which a
defendant need not be informed before pleading guilty." Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570
(8th Cir. 1984); see also Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that "the
majority of circuits deciding the issue have concluded that parole ineligibility is only a collateral
consequence," including the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); cf. Sparks v.
Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting how the Sixth Circuit "has yet to decide
whether erroneous advice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel" and citing "other circuits which have held or noted that misinformation concerning
parole eligibility can be ineffective assistance of counsel").
474 U.S. at 60. Justice White, in his concurrence, would have denied Hill an
82. IHil4
evidentiary hearing because paperwork in the case suggested that defense counsel did not know
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Although it never reached the issue, the Hill decision signals that the
Court might treat affirmative misadvice differently from silence, at least with
respect to the consequence of defense counsel's advice regarding parole
eligibility. The Court noted that it has "never held that the United States
Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about
parole eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to be
voluntary." 83 It then went on to point out how, rather than grounding his
claim in due process and voluntariness, Hill instead "relie [d] entirely on the
claim that his plea was 'involuntary' as a result of ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney supplied him with information about parole
eligibility that was erroneous."8 4 This suggests that the Court would
recognize that a defendant's lawyer has a very different relationship to his or
her client than the trial court has to that individual as a defendant entering
a guilty plea,8 5 and that it might constitutionalize that recognition of
defense counsel's unique role in a Sixth Amendment analysis. The Supreme
Court also mentioned misadvice in Brady v. United States.86 Although the
right to pre-plea information was not at issue in the case, in its discussion of
the definition of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the decision stated
that a "'plea of guilty... must stand unless induced by [among other things]
... misrepresentation.'- 8 7 This suggests that the Court might treat
88
affirmative misadvice differently from silence.

that Hill had a prior out-of-state conviction, and Hill thus provided no factual basis for the
claim that counsel misled him. Id. at 61 (White,J., concurring). HoweverJustice White went on
to note that, had Hill provided such a factual basis, Hill would have provided sufficient
allegations of prejudice to win a hearing. He also found that, if a defendant demonstrated
affirmative misadvice about parole eligibility, the defendant would satisfy the unreasonableattorney-behavior prong of the ineffective-assistance test. Id. at 62.
83. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 693 (discussing the defendant-attorney relationship).
86. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
87. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957)); see also
Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 n.1 (2009) (noting how Brady's statement about
misrepresentation was dictum).
88. In a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice Scalia suggested that-should the Court
have occasion to review Brady's dictum on misrepresentations-it might take a restrictive view of
a defendant's ability to seek a remedy under such circumstances. Id. ("[I]t is hornbook law that
misrepresentation requires an intent at the time of contracting not to perform." (citation
omitted)). While it is unclear just what the Court meant in this one-line reference to the Brady
language, the argument could be made that only intentional misrepresentations qualify for
potential plea withdrawal. This would severely curtail the affirmative-misadvice exception as
understood in most jurisdictions, and would bar plea withdrawal except in the rare
circumstance when defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge purposely misled the
defendant. Such a restrictive reading, however, seems unlikely in light of Hill v. Lockhart and
other precedent.

95 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[2009]

These are just a few examples of the lower courts' flawed, cluttered, and
contradictory applications of the jurisprudence of informational rights in
the guilty-plea process which currently sits at the intersection of the
collateral-consequences rule and the affirmative-misadvice exception. These
examples illustrate just some of the problems with a rule that differentiates
between silence and misinformation. The next Part discusses the effect of
the rule and exception on defense counsel's actual conduct in providing, or
failing to provide, information about collateral consequences.
III. IGNORANCE

IS EFFECTIVELY

BLISS: TROUBLING INCENTIVES FLOW FROM THE

COLLATERAL-CONSEQUENCES RULE AND AFFIRMAT1VE-MISADVICE EXCEPTION

Judicial decisions that incorporate the collateral-consequences rule and
affirmative-misadvice exception deliver the following message to lawyers and
judges: it is better to say nothing than take the risk of saying something
wrong, particularly in an area that is likely not within the direct expertise of
the lawyer or judge. Part III.A examines this claim. Part III.B explores the
various non-constitutional factors, including state statutes and professional
standards, which influence counsel's approach to advising about the
collateral consequences of guilty pleas. These other sources of regulation
have made important advances in recognizing the need for counseling
about certain serious non-penal consequences. The enforcement
mechanisms attached to such sources, however, are either non-existent or
seriously flawed, negatively impacting their ability to regulate behavior. With
the lower courts' current majority approach rendering defense counsel's
failure to warn largely immune from attack, the imprimatur on silence
remains strong. It is time for the Supreme Court to recognize the evolved
(and evolving) standards
requiring advisement about collateral
consequences and to incorporate these sources into the constitutional
structure. This would give real meaning to the right to effective assistance of
counsel in the decision-making process leading up to any guilty plea.
A.

THE ETHICAL PROBLEM: THE AFFIRMA TIVE-MISADVICE RULE ENCOURAGES
SILENCE ABOUT COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

As it stands in most state and federal jurisdictions, the constitutional
norm governing advisement about collateral consequences is that silence is
permissible and misinformation is a violation. This standard encourages
criminaljustice-system actors to keep quiet about collateral consequences.
The dichotomy also unfolds against a backdrop of a strong, systemic desire
for, and overvaluing of, two facets of plea bargaining (and the criminal
justice system more generally): finality and efficiency.
All cases must have an end point or the criminal justice system would
suffer in at least two respects: (1) its ability to handle cases and (2) public
perception. Many criminal-justice-system actors, however, overvalue finality
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to the detriment of constitutional protection,89 and stubbornly resist change
on the theory that any inroad will threaten to topple our high-volume
system. 90 This dynamic furthers what is an already troubling incentive
structure fostered by the collateral-consequences rule and affirmativemisadvice exception.
For example, if the prosecution has reason to believe that defense
counsel has not advised his client about the involuntary, post-sentence civil
commitment as a "sexually violent predator" that might follow a proposed
guilty plea, the current constitutional rules encourage the prosecutor to
remain silent. A prosecutor might base this belief on the fact that defense
counsel in a particular case did not attempt to negotiate a plea to a nonqualifying offense, or negotiate a lower prison sentence in recognition of the
fact that the particular defendant would likely be committed after serving his
prison sentence. The prosecutor can be assured that the guilty plea will
stand so long as no information is offered to the client on the commitment
consequence. He may also believe that the plea deal will fall apart should
the defendant learn of the potential for lifelong involuntary commitment. 91
Judges have similar incentives and may feel the pull of finality even more
strongly because they do not want their name on a decision reversing a
conviction. Therefore, the bottom line is that if no one says anything about
any collateral consequence to an individual pleading guilty, then the current
majority approach will protect the finality of that plea.
Efficiency, an important component of any high-volume justice system,
is perhaps an even stronger and more overt influence on what happens in a
criminal case leading up to a guilty plea.9 2 Using the preceding example, if a

89.

See Roger Fairfax, Harmless ConstitutionalErrorand the InstitutionalSignificance of the Jury,

76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2030-31 (2008) (critiquing the Court's failure to include jury-trial
rights in the exceptions-to-harmless-error law for "structural" problems).
90. Justice Stevens has voiced his concern that:
Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of
our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays
and impairs the orderly administration ofjustice. The impact is greatest when new
grounds for setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of
criminal convictions result from such pleas. Moreover, the concern that unfair
procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is only
rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea.
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d

521, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1971) (StevensJ., dissenting)).
91. This belief may be unfounded, or at least exaggerated. See infra text accompanying
note 295 (explaining how any collateral consequence will play a lesser role in most defendants'
decision-making process when the prosecution has strong evidence of guilt and thus a
conviction after trial is highly likely).
92.
See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR
CHIEFJUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 39-52 (2006),
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGroup
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defendant learns that he might be involuntarily committed for life as a result
of the conviction that will follow his plea, the delay resulting from the
exploration between the defendant and his lawyer of this serious
consequence may prolong the resolution of the case. That extra time could
be viewed-at least in the short-term view-as hampering speedy processing
93
in our high-volume criminal courts.
One would hope that competent and conscientious defense lawyers
would warn their clients, at a minimum, about the more serious and likely
collateral consequences. While not all defense lawyers are directly invested
in the finality of guilty pleas and rapid movement of cases through the
system, there are significant pressures to take these things into account even
for the most competent and conscientious. Such institutional pressures will
be particularly strong for those who are appointed to criminal cases by
judges or through an "assigned counsel" plan. 94 These indigent defense
lawyers are not part of a larger defender organization, and are likely to have
private criminal or civil matters that compete for their time and attention,
often receiving a disproportionate amount of that time. 95 While there are
certainly high-quality lawyers in this group, there is also enormous pressure
to avoid advocacy that might be perceived as thwarting efficiency, which in
the overburdened criminal justice system means a severe tilt towards
practices resulting in swift, final dispositions. 96 There is a disincentive to take
the time to learn about collateral consequences, especially when there is
often inadequate time to devote to other aspects of the assigned cases that
may be more pressing and constitutionally valued (i.e., a looming hearing or
trial). There is also a disincentive to introduce anything into the pleabargaining equation-such as the need for the defendant and the

Report.pdf [hereinafter SPANGENBERG STUDY] (describing, in report on state of indigent
defense in New York State, overarching concern with cost and efficiency).

93. This is a short-term view because over the full life of a criminal case it is more efficient
to offer more information up front so that defendants do not later have-and pursue-claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel or a due-process violation based upon the failure to warn
about a serious consequence.
94. See, e.g., N.Y. COUNTY LAw § 722(3) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2009) (describing
assigned counsel plan as "[r]epresentation by counsel furnished pursuant to a plan of a bar
association in each county or the city in which a county is wholly contained whereby the services
of private counsel are rotated and coordinated by an administrator, and such administrator may
be compensated for such service"); see also AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID &
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEO'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL
JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 2 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter GIDEOA'S BROKEN PROMISE] (listing
various state indigent defense systems lacking independence from the judiciary).
95.

96.

GIDEoArS BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 94, at 10.

See, e.g., id. at 16-19 (discussing factors influencing minimal representation); see also
SPANGENBERO STUDY, supra note 92, at 39-52 (describing the sometimes overt pressures on
defenders to keep representation cheap).
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prosecutor to consider any collateral consequences that may flow from the
conviction-that might delay what could otherwise be a guilty plea taken at
or shortly after the defendant's initial appearance in court.
Similar pressures exist for public defenders. Although working in an
office with other defenders may mitigate those pressures-by office policy
and by the potential to influence local practice due to the number of cases
handled-public defenders are also repeat players within a system that
rewards rapid case processing. In many jurisdictions, defenders are
appointed or elected, bringing political pressure to bear and putting
efficiency at the forefront. 97 Indeed, some public defenders are "restricted
•..

from providing representation in any non-criminal areas that relate to a

case" and may in any case "lack sufficient knowledge and training in th [at]
98
area."
Most courts have failed to see the problematic incentives set up by a
constitutional counseling structure that accepts both the collateralconsequences rule and the affirmative-misadvice exception. They have also
failed to see how systemic pressures can exacerbate these incentives. The
New Mexico Supreme Court is a rare exception to this myopia. In State v.
Paredez, Ramon Paredez moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that,
before he pleaded, both the trial judge and defense counsel told him he
"could" be deported based on his conviction when, in fact, deportation was
almost certain. 99 The state high court found that "while it certainly would
have been prudent for the district court to have been more specific in its
admonition to Defendant or to inquire into Defendant's understanding of
the deportation consequences of his plea," the trial judge "was not
constitutionally required to advise Defendant that his guilty plea ... almost
certainly would result in his deportation."100 The court then immediately
noted that its ruling on the trial judge's advisement obligations did not
absolve defense counsel of the constitutional obligation to correctly counsel
the client with respect to that same information. It went on to hold that both
affirmative misadvice and the total failure to warn about immigration
consequences of pleading guilty by counsel violated Sixth Amendment
principles. 101

97. See SPANGENBERG STUDY, supra note 92, at 39-52 ("While a lack of independence from
the counties exists with all providers, it is perhaps most true for the public defenders who are
appointed and serve at the pleasure of the [N.Y.] counties.").
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 89.
State v. Paredez, 101 P.Dd 799, 801 (N.M. 2004).
Id. at 803.

Id. at 805 ("[D]efense attorneys are obligated to determine the immigration status of
their clients. If a client is a non-citizen, the attorney must advise that client of the specific
immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation would be virtually
certain."). It is important to note that under the Paredez ruling, a defendant does not win plea
101.

withdrawal simply by demonstrating misadvice (although even this is no simple task, see supra
notes 67-76 and accompanying text). He must also prove prejudice, a formidable barrier given
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Under this ruling, which was based on federal constitutional law, the
right to effective assistance means that defense counsel must provide clients
with correct pre-plea advice about the immigration consequences of any
guilty plea. In declining to draw a distinction between misadvice and nonadvice, Paredez reasoned that to do so "would 'naturally create a chilling
effect on the attorney's decision to offer advice,' because if the attorney's
advice regarding immigration consequences is incorrect, the attorney's
representation may be deemed 'ineffective." ' 10 2 The Paredez court also
recognized the problems that arise when Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel
jurisprudence differentiates between direct and collateral consequences,
and correctly identified the relevant issue as whether "the defendant did not
receive information sufficient to make an informed decision to plead
guilty."1 03 Finally, the Paredez court noted that a rule which allowed attorneys
to remain silent about such an important consequence as deportation
"would 'place[] an affirmative duty to discern complex legal issues on a class
04
of clients least able to handle that duty." 1
Unfortunately, most jurisdictions fail to take these issues-which
highlight both counsel's critical informational role in the guilty-plea process
and defendants' related difficulties in understanding the full consequences
of any plea without assistance-into account and instead mechanically
adhere to the direct-collateral divide. Defense counsel in most jurisdictions
thus operates in a constitutional world which explicitly encourages silence.
As a result, counsel takes a risk when she wades into the sometimes complex
and often unfamiliar territory of advising a client about the non-penal
consequences of a guilty plea, which may involve issues ranging from
immigration to public benefits to professional licensing. The risk is that the
advice will be incorrect and that counsel will be the "ineffective" lawyer who
allowed this to happen.

the courts' demonstrated willingness to find lack of prejudice even in situations where the
requisite "reasonable probability" of a different outcome, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984), seems clear to any trial lawyer. See, e.g.,
State v. Franklin, 89 S.W.3d 865, 872
(Ark. 2002) (finding no prejudice despite counsel's failure to properly inform defendant of his
right to testify, file any discovery or evidentiary motions; request a limiting instruction, object to
gunshot residue testimony, and present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a
murder trial); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding no
prejudice where defense attorney slept during death-penalty trial because McFarland failed to
show when or for how long attorney slept, or if the jury took note of it, and because cocounsel's "decision" to let counsel sleep might have been a strategic move to gain jury
sympathy). Although the high prejudice hurdle makes ineffectiveness claims difficult to prove,
even in cases involving affirmative misadvice, defense counsel still operates in the shadow of
such standards and is thus influenced by them.
102. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805 (quoting John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?,
36 U. MIcH.J.L. REFOM 691, 726 (2003)).
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Francis, supra note 102, at 726) (alteration in original).
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The message is clear: counsel can avoid the "ineffectiveness" label,
through either a right-to-counsel or a due-process violation, by simply
remaining silent about any and all collateral consequences. Clearly, this is
not the message that courts should send.
B.

NON-CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCINGA7TORNEY
BEHAVIOR ALSO SANCTION SILENCE

The preceding discussion in this Article has focused on the federal
constitutional law governing advisement about collateral consequences that
developed in the lower state and federal courts. There are also a number of
non-constitutional regulatory forces that can influence whether defense
counsel will offer advice about collateral consequences. 105
Recent Supreme Court dictum, discussing a criminal defendant's
interest in knowing whether relief from deportation would be available
following a guilty plea, highlights these non-constitutional norms. In INS v.
St. Cyr, the Court stated: "[C] ompetent defense counsel, following the advice
of numerous practice guides, would have advised [the defendant]
concerning the provision's importance." 10 6 The real question is whether
counsel has the incentive to follow such guides and other similar sources.
This section explores that issue, as well as a number of other nonconstitutional regulatory forces which, when combined with a constitutional
rule encouraging silence, might push defense counsel to choose silence over
the risk of misadvice. These forces include: the realities of high-volume
criminal practice; the various statutes, rules, and standards related to
advisement; a professional disciplinary proceeding against counsel under
state ethical rules; local custom and practice with respect to advisement;

105. State constitutional law mandating advisement about collateral consequences is
another potentially large influence on behavior. See, e.g., State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238
(N.J. 2003) (holding that "when the consequence of a plea may be so severe that a defendant
may be confined for the remainder of his or her life [under New Jersey's Sexually Violent
Predator Act], fundamental fairness demands that the trial court inform defendant of that
possible consequence" (emphasis added)). Although Bellamy held that the judge, not defense
counsel, must provide warnings, such a constitutional mandate will clearly have an effect on the
attorney-client conversation. Unlike New Jersey, however, most states simply track established
federal constitutional law in interpreting their own constitutions, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.7(a) (3d ed. 2008), or do not-for various reasons--even analyze
duty-to-warn cases under state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253
S.W.3d 482, 484-85 (Ky. 2008) (applying federal constitutional law), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317
(2009). There are thus very few state constitutional decisions extending a duty to warn about
non-penal consequences.
106. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001). Although St. Cyrs admonishment was
only dictum, it suggests that the Court-at least as constituted in 2001-might be receptive to
establishing a duty to warn defendants about immigration consequences under a Sixth
Amendment analysis.
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negative reputational effects for a provider of incorrect information; and a
malpractice tort action against counsel who misadvised. 07
Taken together, these forces have a potentially strong effect on whether
defense counsel will attempt to warn a defendant about a collateral
consequence or will instead remain silent. The sections below explore how
each of these forces, either directly or indirectly, does not encourage full
disclosure about such consequences and may actually discourage the
defense lawyer who tries but fails to warn correctly.
1.

The Realities of Criminal Practice

It is important to situate the ethical critique of the intersection of the
collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misadvice exception in the
reality of criminal practice. It may be comforting to assume that defense
lawyers will not shy away from providing information for fear of an
ineffectiveness label and to believe that trial-level judges are not so
concerned about the finality of guilty pleas and efficiency of case
management that they will remain silent about collateral consequences.
Unfortunately, this is not always-or perhaps even usually-the case.
Nationwide, about eighty percent of defendants cannot afford to hire an
attorney. 108 Most of these defendants' cases are handled by lawyers working
under crushing caseload conditions, 10 9 often struggling to undertake even
the most basic tasks on their cases. 110 Indeed, the head of the busy Miami107. As one commentator has noted, "[T]here are essentially three levels on which to assess
poor lawyering: the constitutional level, the civil level, and the disciplinary level." Meredith J.
Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of CriminalDefense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU
L. REV. 1, 5. These mechanisms are all "separate, each relies upon the satisfaction of different
legal tests, and the fact that a criminal defense attorney's misconduct has been conclusively
established in one setting will not inevitably dictate the same result in a proceeding in one of
the other venues." JOHN M. BuRKoFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAW & LIABILITY § 1:8 (2d ed.
2008).
108. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indigent Defense Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
id.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (stating that in 1999, in the nation's most populous one
hundred counties, public defenders handled 82% of the 4.2 million cases); see also Radha
Iyengar, An Analysis of the Perfomance ofFederal IndigentDefense Counsel 34 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007) (finding, in a sample of 115, 415 federal criminal
cases from 1997-2001, that 72.9% of defendants qualified as indigent for the purpose of having
counsel assigned).
109. See GIDEoArS BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 94, at 17-18 (finding that public defenders'
offices and criminal defense lawyers operate under caseloads that are far above recommended
numerical standards, and some offices have even been forced to withdraw from representation
due to such overload).
110. SeeJane Fritsch & David Rohde, Two-Tier Justice: Lawyers Often Fail New York's Poor,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at Al (focusing, in first of three articles addressing the problems facing
criminal defendants in New York City courts, on 137 homicide cases handled by courtappointed lawyers in 2000, and describing their failure to employ even the most basic trial
strategy, including the failure to inform a defendant of his right not to testify). See generally
Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 746-74 (1987) (describing poor lawyering practices of New York
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Dade County Public Defender's Office recently "took the witness stand.., to
make the case that his office is so underfunded his attorneys must refuse to
take hundreds of cases" because "his attorneys are already overburdened
1
and can't do their constitutional duty for any new clients."' '
A constitutional norm that encourages the cost- and time-cutting
measures of avoiding any and all imparting of information about collateral
consequences may well have the effect of advancing silence on such issues.
In effect, it guides attorneys in making hard choices about how to allocate
scarce resources. Such difficult triage decisions are an unfortunate part of
the indigent-defense landscape. 1 2 Collateral consequences, however, have
recently grown both in scope and severity and often overshadow the
criminal case itself, particularly when the case involves minor charges. 113 In
many cases, exploring the potential collateral consequences of a particular
guilty plea with a defendant and counseling him about what may really
happen as a result of the plea are just as important as, or more important
than, something as basic as investigation of the case.
For example, if a person faces charges of misdemeanor drug possession,
there may be relatively little investigation to do in the case. It would be
critical, however, to ask the person about his immigration status, whether he
or his family live in public housing, whether he is receiving or is about to
receive federal student loan assistance, and to be aware of how these and
other civil liabilities might affect that person. In short, the constitutional
rule has not caught up to the current reality of the effect of such
consequences on defendants, their families, and their communities, and
thus may lead to a misguided allocation of scarce resources.
The intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and the affirmativemisadvice exception may also discourage the various parties from educating

City indigent defense-panel attorneys studied in mid-1980s, including attorneys' failures to file

discovery motions and investigate, even in most homicide cases).
111. Susannah A. Nesmith, Dade Public Defender: Caseload Is Untenable; Miami-Dade's Public
Defender Testifies About How Overworked His Office Is in a Bid to Reduce His Caseload, MIAMI HERALD,
July

31,

2008,

available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/Florida085

("Several other public defenders around the state [of Florida] have refused to take some cases
because of underfunding .. ").
112.

See generally Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from

Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 801 (2004) (arguing that underfunding of indigent
defense is a long-term reality, and attorneys and judges must thus make conscious decisions
about the allocation of scarce resources); John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S.

CAL. L. REV. 1215 (1994) (suggesting an ethical approach to the allocation of scarce defense
resources among indigent criminal defendants); cf Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic
Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry Into Criminal Defense Lauyering, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1089-90 (2004) (discrediting argument that requiring defense

counsel to give warnings about applicable collateral consequence imposes too great a burden
on defense counsel's limited time resources).
113. See supra notes 25-30, infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text (discussing growth in
collateral consequences).
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themselves about the increasingly complex web of collateral consequences.
These span across immigration, employment, housing, public benefits, and a
number of other areas, and can be situated in federal and state laws,
regulations, and local ordinances. The increasing severity and pervasive
nature of collateral consequences has led to a corresponding growth in
114
available information and trainings on a variety of related topics.
However, if the bottom line is that advisement of such information is not
required as part of the process leading up to the plea, busy lawyers have little
incentive to avail themselves of these critical educational opportunities. If
lawyers and judges are not educated about collateral consequences, they will
not be able to warn defendants; indeed, they will be even less likely to warn
defendants since erroneous information may threaten the finality of any
guilty plea or have other negative consequences.
2.

Rules of Criminal Procedure

State statutes and rules of criminal procedures are part of the body of
rules that regulate attorney (and judicial) conduct in the criminal justice
system,1 15 and are one factor that affects whether defense counsel provides
information about collateral consequences to clients. "(A] t least two dozen
jurisdictions by court rule or statute require advisement of potential
deportation to those pleading guilty." 116 However, only a few states require

114.

See, e.g.,

GA. PUB. DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNCIL, NEW ATTORNEY TRAINING AND

MENTORING PLAN (2006), available at http://training.gpdsc.com/tilpp/mentoring__plan.pdf

[hereinafter GA. PUB. DEFENDER STANDARDS] (listing sentencing training that includes
"Collateral Consequences" and "Immigration Consequences & Ethical & Professional
Considerations"); Reentry Net: Serving People from Arrest to Reintegration, http://www.
reentry.net/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (listing training opportunities and other resources
about collateral consequences of criminal convictions).
115. Certainly, attorneys and judges can adhere to norms that rise above the minimum
requirements set out in the governing body of rules. This is particularly likely to happen when
an attorney practices in an environment that emphasizes a particular area or strives to a
generally high standard of practice. For example, there are defender offices that work to
incorporate collateral consequences and reentry into daily practice by understanding the
critical need to address these issues both up front-before any disposition of the criminal
case-and after the individual has served his sentence or has been convicted. See infra note 178
(describing such offices).
116.

UNIF. ACT ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONvICTIONS § 5 cmt. (Draft 2008),

available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2008amdraft.pdf;
see also
Brief of Petitioner at 17, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009), 2009 WL 1497552
(stating that a "solid minority of states (23 plus the District of Columbia) by statute or rule
require judges to warn noncitizens of the immigration consequences of guilty pleas"); cf Brief
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 20, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. June 2, 2009), 2009 WL 1567356 at *20
("Thirty jurisdictions including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have statutes, rules, or
standard plea forms that require a defendant to receive notice of potential immigration
consequences before the court will accept his guilty plea."). For a survey of the various rulebased approaches that states have taken with respect to the duty to advise on immigration
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warnings on other consequences, such as loss of the right to lawfully possess
a firearm, 117 the loss of federal benefits, 118 or civil commitment as a "sexually
violent predator."11 9 Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
federal judges have no duty to warn (or ensure that defense counsel has
warned) a defendant about any collateral consequence prior to accepting a
20
guilty plea.'
Most such advisement rules-usually located in a state's procedural
rules governing the entry of guilty pleas-only regulate judges' conduct, and
fail to address defense counsel's duty to warn clients about collateral
consequences. As some courts have recognized, "Defense counsel is in a
much better position to ascertain the personal circumstances of his client so
as to determine what indirect consequences the guilty plea may trigger."121 A

consequences prior to guilty pleas, see Attila Bogdan, Guilty Pleas by Non-Citizens in Illinois:
ImmigrationConsequences Reconsidered, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 19, 49-58 (2003).
117.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-109(b) (West 2007) (requiring trial court accepting
guilty plea to warn defendant that "from the moment of conviction for a domestic violence
offense the defendant will never again be able to lawfully possess or buy a firearm of any kind"
and allowing plea acceptance only if "defendant clearly states on the record that the defendant
is aware of [this] consequence").
118.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-1-2(a)(4) (West 2008) (firearms); 1"O. R. CRIM. P.
11(b)(1) (requiring trial court accepting guilty plea to advise defendant that a controlled
substance conviction may result in loss of federal benefits).
119.
See MASs. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3) (B) (requiring trial judge to inform defendant on the
record "of any different or additional punishment based upon ... sexually dangerous persons
provisions of the General Laws"); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(8) (requiring that judges
inform defendants of deportation consequences of guilty pleas); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14,
19 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting Massachusetts requirement to warn about civil commitment but
stating that "[flailure to follow this state procedural rule does not affect our analysis of Steele's
federal constitutional claim").
120.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see also United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir.
1988) ("Rule 11 does not require a sentencing court to explain 'collateral' consequences of a
guilty plea to a defendant."). There is no Rule 11 duty to warn about immigration despite
recommendations, at hearings to amend the rule, that such warnings be given. Advisory Comm.
on Criminal Rules, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
9 (Apr. 28-29, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/Min4-2003.pdf
(detailing 5-6 vote that failed to pass "an amendment to Rule 11 that would require the court
to inform an alien who is pleading guilty of the possible collateral consequences that might
result, i.e., deportation"); see also United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(Mikva, J., concurring). In his concurrence to Del RosarioJudgeMikva noted:
I would hope that the Rules Committee of the Judicial Conference would consider
amending Rule 11 ... to require ajudge taking a guilty plea to inform an alien that
pleading guilty might result in deportation-at least when the judge is made aware
of the defendant's alien status before accepting his plea.
Id.
121.
Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974); see also State v. Paredez, 101
P.3d 799, 803-04 (N.M. 2004) ("Our conclusion that the district court did not err in its
admonition to the Defendant does not mean that Defendant's attorney was relieved from
informing him that he almost certainly would be deported if his guilty plea was accepted by the
court.").
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proforma warning from a judge in court also comes too late in the process of
a criminal case-namely as a defendant is actually entering the guilty pleato realistically allow for the individual to integrate this critical new
information into his decision.

122

Still, imposing a duty upon judges to warn

might affect defense counsel's behavior, at least with respect to the
123
consequences set out in the advisement statute.
However, even when state law requires advisement about a collateral
consequence, most of those jurisdictions lack an enforcement mechanism
for failure to follow the rule. For example, New York state judges accepting a
guilty plea to a felony offense must inform a defendant that if he is not a
United States citizen, his guilty plea "may result in... deportation, exclusion
from admission to the United States or denial of naturalization." 124 Yet the
same statute goes on to say that any failure to follow this advisement law
"shall not be deemed to affect the voluntariness of a plea of guilty or the
validity of a conviction." 125 Several other states also have an explicit bar to
plea withdrawal written into their guilty-plea-advisement statutes for
immigration consequences. 126 In other states, courts have found that failure
to follow state law requiring pre-plea warnings does not necessarily invalidate
127
the plea.

That "a defendant ... has little need to hear a ritual recitation of his rights by a
trial judge" obviously does not imply the contrary proposition, that a defendant to
whom a court has read a pro forma advisement... cannot profit from competent
legal advice about that advisement or concerns it may raise, under the
circumstances, for that particular defendant.
In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1178 n.5 (Cal. 2001) (citation omitted).
122. See Manuel D. Vargas, Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas or Convictions, 30 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 709 (2006) (discussing New York's advisement statute).
123. See, e.g., ME. R. CRIM. P. 11 (allowing judge to adjourn plea proceedings after warning
about a particular consequence in order to give the defendant time to consult with his
attorney).
124.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50(7) (McKinney 2007).

125. Id. (noting how failure to advise shall not "afford a defendant any rights in a
subsequent proceeding relating to such defendant's deportation, exclusion or denial of
naturalization").
126. See, e.g., MD. R. 4-242(e) (West 2009) ("The omission of advice concerning the
collateral consequences of a plea does not itself mandate that the plea be declared invalid.");
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-12-22(a) (2002) (mandating immigration warning but stating that "[f]ailure
to so inform the defendant at the arraignment shall not invalidate any action subsequently
taken by the court").
127.
See Commonwealth v. Coffin, No. 04-P-1296, slip op., 2006 IATL 374479, at *2 (Mass.
App. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006) (denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and noting that
"[w]hile compliance with the procedures set out in [the state statute requiring notification of
the sexually dangerous persons provision for civil commitment] is mandatory, adherence to or
departure from them is but one factor to be considered in resolving whether a plea was
knowingly and voluntarily made"); see also Lopez v. State, 71 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that although sex-offender registration is a "serious" consequence, and Texas
court rules require a pre-plea warning to defendants about it, defendant has no right to
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In some instances, even the ability to withdraw a plea does not mean
that an individual will avoid negative collateral consequences. For example,
several statutes mandating advisement about immigration consequences
allow for plea withdrawal if a defendant who was not warned can
demonstrate that he may face immigration consequences based on the
conviction. 128 Yet the 1996 amendments to federal immigration law deem a
plea allocution in a criminal case-where the defendant admits to the
underlying facts-sufficient for imposing the relevant immigration
consequence. Later withdrawal of the plea does not bar immigration officials
from proceeding upon the earlier factual admissions. 129 This underscores
the importance of early, comprehensive warnings about collateral
consequences of guilty pleas.
While state statutes and rules of criminal procedure have come a long
way in recognizing the need for more thorough warnings about particular
consequences (even if they are deemed collateral), they still account for only
about half of the jurisdictions in the United States. In addition, most of
about
immigration
require
warnings
only
these jurisdictions
consequences. 130 In most instances, even the immigration advisement law is

withdraw his plea for failure to receive this warning because his "substantial rights were not
affected by the trial court's failure to comply").
Some states do explicitly allow for plea withdrawal for failure to follow an advisement
rule. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 29D (2008) (stating that if the court fails to advise
about immigration consequences, and if the defendant can later "show[] that his plea and
conviction may have or has had one of the enumerated consequences," the court "shall ...
permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.08 (1)-(2) (West
2008) (requiring trial court to advise about immigration consequences and allowing plea
withdrawal upon failure to warn with showing that plea is "likely to result in the defendant's
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country or denial of naturalization"); State v.
Douangmala, 646 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Wis. 2002) (holding that court's failure to advise about
deportation leads to the right to withdraw plea without regard to harmless-error analysis);
Sango-Dema v. District Director, I.N.S., 122 F. Supp. 2d 213, 217 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting how
state law mandates pre-plea advisement about deportation consequences and how, "[w]ithout
such a notice, the court must vacate the plea") (citation omitted). However, the majority are
silent on the issue of remedy for such a violation. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1022 (2007);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon 2006). In these jurisdictions, the likely
outcome will be to deny plea withdrawal, particularly with the constitutional backdrop of a rule
allowing silence.
128. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-12-22(c) (2002) (allowing a defendant to withdraw a plea
after showing that he was not warned and will face immigration consequences).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A)(i) (Supp. 1997); see also Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 777
N.E.2d 116, 119-20 (Mass. 2002) (describing how Villalobos would be subject to deportation
under federal immigration law based on admission to the underlying facts of the crime, despite
fact that court would dismiss all charges upon satisfaction of certain conditions); Susan L.
Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV.
269, 320-24 (1997) (describing a situation where a defendant is not convicted under state law
but is seen as convicted-and thus deportable-under federal immigration law).
130. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (listing the few states that require
warnings for consequences other than immigration).
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basically aspirational. The individual who was not advised, despite state
mandate, generally has no remedy within the criminal case.
In short, state laws and rules currently do not do enough to encourage
criminal defense lawyers to impart adequate information to their clients who
face the possibility of collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. The
inadequacy and unenforceability of state law and rules is combined with a
constitutional structure in the lower courts that fosters silence. For these
reasons, it is critical that the Supreme Court in Padilla incorporate these
evolving norms of state and local practice into effective assistance
constitutional jurisprudence. 131
3.

Professional Discipline Under State Ethics Codes

Criminal defense attorneys, like all lawyers admitted to practice in a
jurisdiction, are subject to the disciplinary authority of that jurisdiction
under its rules of professional conduct. Almost all jurisdictions, pursuant to
their high court's inherent authority to regulate its Bar, 132 have adopted a
version of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 133 These state ethics codes provide only general guidance for
attorney behavior, and unlike some professional standards, state codes do
not explicitly address a duty to inform clients about collateral consequences
of criminal convictions. 134 A number of provisions, however, could certainly
be interpreted to require such warnings, including the duties to "explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation"; 35 to stay current on the
law; 136 and of competent representation requiring "legal knowledge, skill,
for
the
necessary
reasonably
and
preparation
thoroughness
representation"; 137 as well as the admonition that a lawyer "may refer not
131. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing how effective-assistance
jurisprudence uses professional standards and other sources in determining what constitutes
competent attorney behavior under the first prong of Stricklands effectiveness test).
132. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (referring to inherent power of
federal courts to regulate and discipline those who appear before them).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004). Only California follows another model.
133.
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009), available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/
rules/Rules.Professional-Conduct.pdf; see also Am. Legal Ethics Library, Topical Overview,
(last
Index of Narratives, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/comparative/index.htm#1.1

visited Nov. 11, 2009) (listing adoption status of Model Rules by state).
See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing professional standards). However, professional
134.
standards such as the American Bar Association's Defense Function Standards "have been
relied upon extensively by courts, by state and local bar ethics committees, and by state and
local lawyer disciplinary agencies in assessing the appropriate role of criminal defense counsel
in particular problematic situations." BURKOFF, supra note 107, § 1:5.
135.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.4 (2004).

136. R. 1.1 cmt. 6 ("To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should ...
").
engage in continuing study and education ....
137.

R. 1.1. Comment 2 to Rule 1.1 further states:
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only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
138
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
The issue of affirmative misadvice arose in at least one disciplinary
proceeding. Defense attorney Steven Black came before the Oregon State
Bar Association's Disciplinary Board on charges of ethical-code violations for
his representation of clients in three separate criminal cases. 139 One of those
cases involved felony drug charges where Black negotiated a plea agreement
for a non-citizen client, failed to conduct adequate research into the
immigration consequences of the proposed plea, and then erroneously
advised the client that the conviction would not result in deportation. 140 The
Board found Black "guilty of ineffective and imprecise representation of his
clients [and] ... negligence." 14 1 He thus violated state disciplinary rules
requiring "competent representation" to a client and requiring that lawyers
refrain from "[e]ngag[ing] in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice." 142 These violations, combined with various others in two other
criminal cases in which Black served as defense counsel, led the Board to
impose a one-year suspension from practice. 143 Black's client, however, was
deported, 144 and thus obviously received no relief from the disciplinary
proceeding. Indeed, even an admitted violation of state ethical rules will not
assure a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel with the remedy of plea
withdrawal.'

45

A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. ... A lawyer can
provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer
of established competence in the field in question.

Id. cmt. 2.
138.

R. 2.1. While most collateral consequences cannot be categorized as non-legal, there

are some that are not located in state or federal law or local regulation. For example, a person
who pleads guilty to misdemeanor theft may not be statutorily barred from particular
employment, but might live in an area where the local employers' practice is to require

"voluntary" fingerprinting of all prospective employees. Under this particular ethical canon, a
conviction's effects on that individual's economic well-being should be a factor that a criminal
defense attorney is aware of and includes in counseling about the consequences of any guilty
plea.
139.

In re Black, 21 Disciplinary Bd. Rptr. 6, 6-18 (Or. 2007), available at http://www.osbar.

org/_docs/dbreport/dbr2l .pdf.
140.

Id. at 14.

141.
142.
143.

Id. at15.
Id. at 7, 16-18.
Id. at 18.

144.

Black, 21 Disciplinary Bd. Rptr. at 16.

145.

See, e.g., United States v. Nickerson, 556 F.3d 1014, 1018-20 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding

that defense counsel's admitted ethical code violation, namely contacting a witness she knew to
be represented after the witness's attorney told her not to speak with the witness, did not
constitute per se ineffective assistance; nor did it constitute ineffective assistance under the
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It is difficult to disaggregate the affirmative-misadvice violation from the
serious violations in the other two cases in Black. However, it is clear that the
incompetence and negligence findings arose directly from misadvice. Under
prevailing federal constitutional standards of advisement about collateral
consequences, there would have been no violation if Black had said nothing
to his non-citizen client about the immigration consequences of the guilty
146
plea.
One commentator noted that "effective assistance of counsel is simply a
floor that undergirds the minimum level of competence necessary to pass
constitutional muster" and "defense attorneys should look to both their
lawyering role and to ethical norms to guide their obligations pertaining to
collateral consequences."' 47 Although attorneys are bound to conform their
behavior to these state codes, the rules in many instances prove only as
effective as the strength and likelihood of their enforcement mechanism. In
theory, a criminal defense attorney's violation of any of the rules could lead
to a state bar association proceeding to address the alleged misconduct, with
potential sanctions ranging from "no action," to private reprimand, to
disbarment. 148 In reality, the likelihood of such a proceeding or any real
sanction is remote. The Oregon proceeding notwithstanding, "not one
jurisdiction seems actively to use the disciplinary process to protect criminal
defendants from incompetent criminal defense representation."' 49 Even in
traditional two-prong test, because Nickerson failed to demonstrate that the ethical violation

prejudiced him).
146. See supra Part II.B (discussing how lack of advice is allowed but affirmative misadvice is
not). Under Oregon state constitutional law, the result may have been different. This is because
Oregon is in the small minority of jurisdictions that require defense counsel to affirmatively
warn clients about the deportation consequences of any guilty plea. See Gonzalez v. State, 134
P.3d 955, 958 (Or. 2006); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 135.385(2)(d) (2007) (requiring a judge
accepting a guilty plea to inform non-citizen defendants that conviction of a crime may lead to
deportation and other immigration consequences). However, the Oregon rule applies only to
immigration consequences; state constitutional law does not require advisement about other
serious collateral consequences. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Moreno v. State, 208 Or. App. 659, 664
(2006) (finding defense counsel provided constitutionally adequate assistance despite failing to
inform the defendant, prior to a guilty plea, that the guilty plea would require mandatory sexoffender registration).
147. Pinard, supra note 112, at 1082-83.
148. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON PROF'L SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS §§ 2.2-.8 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/regulation/standards
sanctions.pdf (setting out potential sanctions); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
8.5(a) (2004) ("A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs."). In addition,
the Rules provide that "[a] lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal
services in this jurisdiction." Id.
149.
See generally Duncan, supra note 107, at 43 (noting how in the majority ofjurisdictions,
criminal defense lawyers rarely face any disciplinary sanction where a former client claims
ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lauryer
Discipline,20 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 (2007) (noting that state disciplinary agencies formally
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the most egregious instances of professional misconduct in criminal cases,
state bar associations seem loathe to recommend any meaningful
sanction. 150
Finally, because professional discipline does not lead to the ability to
withdraw a plea for the misinformed defendant in the criminal case,
defendants have relatively little incentive to seek such sanctions against their
former attorneys. This leaves enforcement of professional standards
governing defense counsel to the judge and the prosecutor. As these two
institutional actors often work on a repeat basis with defense lawyers, and
could themselves be subject to disciplinary scrutiny from such lawyers, there
may be strong cultural resistance to the idea of such enforcement.
4.

Professional Standards

A number of organizations, ranging from the American Bar Association
("ABA") and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA")
to county bar associations and statewide defender offices, have promulgated
professional standards for criminal-law practice. Many of those relating to
defense practice appear in a Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense

Systems that the U.S. Department of Justice commissioned to present
"national, state, and local standards relating to five major aspects of indigent
51
defense."1
Some professional standards speak directly to the issue of advisement
about collateral consequences. Such standards are relatively new and
continue to develop as the Bar becomes more aware of the existence and
effect of the myriad collateral consequences of criminal convictions
scattered throughout local, state and federal codes and regulations. Most
notably, in 2003, the ABA added the Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary
Disqualification of Convicted Persons ("the 2003 Standards") to its Standardsfor

CriminalJustice.152 Unfortunately (and perhaps not purposely), while the
sanction only about 5600 lawyers per year, despite receiving more than 125,000 lawyer
discipline complaints per year).
150.
See Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Trainingof Lawyers, 94 CORNELL L.
REv. 479, 487 (2009) ("On the relatively rare occasion that an errant lawyer receives some form
of professional discipline, that form is likely to be the gentlest arrow in the quiver: the
admonition or private reprimand."); see also Duncan, supra note 107, at 43.
151.
INST. FOR LAW &JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
(Neal Miller & Peter Ohlhausen eds., 2000), available at http://www.mynlada.org/defender/
DOJ/intro.htm.
152.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS pts. I-IlI (3d ed. 2004); see also Margaret Colgate
Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30

FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1727 (2003) (stating that the "new ABA Standards on Collateral
Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification are the first effort since the 1970s to address the
collateral legal consequences of a conviction in a coherent and comprehensive fashion"). This
section focuses on the ABA Standards because it is to those-along with other, non-standardbased practices such as local custom-that the Supreme Court has turned in determining the
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2003 Standards have evolved with respect to certain aspects of collateral
consequences, they have in other ways weakened both defense counsel's and
the court's duty to warn defendants about collateral consequences during
the guilty-plea process.
For example, the ABA's 1999 StandardsFor CriminalJustice: Pleas of Guilty
("the 1999 Standards") explicitly include a duty to warn defendants about
the collateral consequences of any criminal conviction.
[T] he court should ...advise the defendant that by entering the
plea, the defendant may face additional consequences includingbut
not limited to the forfeiture of property, the loss of certain civil
rights, disqualification from certain governmental benefits,
enhanced punishment if the defendant is convicted of another
crime in the future, and, if the defendant is not a United States
citizen, a change in the defendant's immigration status. The court
should advise the defendant to consult with defense counsel if the
defendant needs additional information concerning the potential
consequences of the plea. 153
The 2003 Standards appear to dilute this advisement standard in two ways:
(1) they distinguish between "collateral" and "discretionary" sanctions, and
require warnings only about the former; and (2) they change the manner in
which the trial court may discharge its duty to warn defendants, moving
from a direct warning to the defendant to a confirmation on the record that
defense counsel has, to the extent possible, warned the defendant.
The first way that the 2003 Standards dilute the duty to advise from the
1999 Standards is by narrowing the list of consequences to which the duty
now applies. The 1999 Standards provided a non-inclusive list which called

prevailing professional norms for competent defense-counsel behavior when analyzing
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text
(discussing incorporation of ABA Standards into constitutional jurisprudence). Other
standards, however, also address defense counsel's duty to warn about collateral consequences.
For example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association's Performance Guidelines for
Criminal Defense Representation's Blackletter Standards state that "[c]ounsel should be
familiar with direct and collateral consequences of the sentence and judgment, including: ...
(8) deportation; (9) use of the conviction for sentence enhancement in future proceedings;
(10) loss of civil rights; (11) impact of a fine or restitution and any resulting civil liability; [and]
(12) restrictions on or loss of license." PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION § 8.2(b) (Nat. Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n 1995); see also id. § 6.2(a) ("In
order to develop an overall negotiation plan, counsel should be fully aware of, and make sure
the client is fully aware of: (1) the maximum term of imprisonment and fine or restitution that
may be ordered ....[and] (3) other consequences of conviction such as deportation, and civil
disabilities."); id. § 6.3(a) ("Counsel should inform the client of any tentative negotiated
agreement reached with the prosecution, and explain to the client the full content of the
agreement, and the advantages and disadvantages and the potential consequences of the
agreement.").
153. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-1.4(c) (3d ed. 1999)
(emphases added).
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for warnings, as noted above, about consequences that touched on property
loss, civil rights, benefits, immigration, and enhanced punishment. Under
the 2003 Standards, the duty to warn applies only to "collateral sanctions,"
not discretionary sanctions. The 2003 Standards define "collateral sanction"
as "a legal penalty, disability or disadvantage, however denominated, that is
imposed on a person automatically upon that person's conviction for a
felony, misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not included in the
sentence."1 54 The 2003 Standards strive to require that a defendant be "fully
informed, before pleading guilty and at sentencing, of the collateral
155
sanctions applicable to the offense (s) charged."
Outside of this small group of consequences are the non-automatic, or
"discretionary disqualifications," defined in the 2003 Standards as "a penalty,
disability or disadvantage, however denominated, that a civil court,
administrative agency, or official is authorized but not required to impose
156
on a person convicted of an offense on grounds related to conviction."
There is no duty to warn defendants of these consequences in the 2003
Standards. In short, under the 2003 Standards there is no duty to warn a
defendant about most consequences before he enters a plea of guilty
because the majority of collateral consequences-even the most serious-

154.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS § 19-1.1(a) (emphasis added). This definition is

quite close to the constitutional jurisprudence's prevailing definition of "direct" consequence.
See, e.g., Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) ("The distinction
between 'direct' and 'collateral' consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in the relevant
decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic
effect on the range of the defendant's punishment."). The difference is that the ABA definition
encompasses even those sanctions "not included in the [penal] sentence." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF
CONVICTED PERSONS § 19-1.1(a). For further explanation of the difference between "collateral
sanction" and "discretionary disqualification," see Symposium, ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice,
Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons: Black Letter with
Commentary, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 441, 441 (2005).
See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
155.
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS § 19-1.2(a) (iv).
156.
Id. § 19-1.1 (b). As one report explains:
If a medical licensing board by law, regulation or policy "must" deny a license to an
applicant with a felony conviction, then it is a collateral sanction, because the effect
is automatic. If a medical licensing board "may" deny a license to those with felony
convictions, then the regulation or policy is a "disqualification."
UNIF. COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS ACT § 2 cmt. (Discussion Draft 2006),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2006MarchMtgDraft.pdf. For
an important critique of the ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary
Disqualification of Convicted Persons from the perspective of holistic defense, see McGregor
Smyth, HolisticIs Not a Bad Word: A CriminalDefense Attorney's Guide to Using Invisible Punishments
as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 479, 493 (2005).
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fall outside the definition of "collateral sanction. 1 57 This includes the highly
severe consequence of civil commitment as a "sexually violent predator,"
which entails a structured process that would place it in the non-"automatic"
158
category.
The second way the 2003 Standards dilute the duty to advise about
collateral consequences is by displacing the burden-from a direct mandate
for the judge, to an indirect task for defense counsel. 159 The 1999 Standards
recommended that the judge advise the defendant directly; the relevant
section refers to defense counsel only to state that the judge should suggest
that the defendant "consult with defense counsel if the defendant needs
additional information concerning the potential consequences of the
plea."160 Under the 2003 Standards, the judge's duty to advise about
collateral sanctions may be satisfied merely "by confirming on the record
that defense counsel's duty of advisement under [the 1999 Standards for
CriminalJustice: Pleas of Guilty] has been discharged." 16 1 The 1999 Standards
state that "[t]o the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and
advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to
157. It seems that the ABA drafters had immigration consequences-specifically,
deportation-in mind when they drew the "collateral sanction"-"discretionary disqualification"
distinction in 2003. Many have argued that, due to the 1996 and later amendments to
immigration law, deportation for those convicted of certain crimes is automatic. See Francis,
supra note 102, at 709 (noting how, under 1996 immigration-law amendments, "a host of
deportation consequences to guilty pleas are certain and almost automatic").
158. Notably, consequences for convicted sex offenders are not expressly listed anywhere in
the text of the various ABA Standards. The only mention of civil commitment in the text of the
Criminal Justice Standards is in the mental-health section, but this refers to the commitment of
convicted individuals in lieu of-and not after having served-the criminal sentence. See
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-10.5 (1989). There is mention of sexual

offenses more generally in other standards' commentary.
159. This is not to say that the court is better equipped than defense counsel to warn a
defendant about relevant consequences. Indeed, the opposite is true. See supra note 121 and
accompanying text (describing how some courts have commented on how attorneys are in the
best position to inform defendants about consequences). But defense counsel's warnings will
usually (and should) take place outside of the courtroom. The judge's on-the-record warnings,
as set out in the various standards, should be a safety valve, a check on counsel's effectiveassistance duties. If this is bootstrapped back to defense counsel, then it cannot serve its
purpose of catching incompetent warnings about consequences and ensuring knowing and
voluntary guilty pleas.
160.

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-1.4(c) (3d ed. 1999). Another

1999 Standard speaks to counsel's duty to warn her client about collateral consequences. Id.
§ 14-3.2(0.
161.

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL

SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY

DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS § 19-2.3(a) (3d ed. 2004) (notification of collateral
sanctions before plea of guilty). Although the Standards do not speak to the prosecutor's role
directly, they do note that "[tihe prosecuting attorney, in considering a plea agreement, may
agree ... where appropriate, to enter an agreement with the defendant regarding the
disposition of related civil matters to which the government is or would be a party, including
civil penalties and/or civil forfeiture." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY
§ 14-3.1(c), (c) (iv).
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the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the
contemplated plea." 162 Thus, if it is not "possible" for defense counsel to
advise a defendant about particular collateral consequences, the duty to
advise is discharged under the 2003 Standards so long as the judge confirms
this on the record. The 1999 Standards' commentary urges defense lawyers
to be proactive in educating themselves about the various collateral
consequences, and notes that it "strives to set an appropriately high
standard" with respect to this advisement provision. 163 However, the
commentary also states that "given the ever-increasing host of collateral
consequences that may flow from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,it may be
very difficult for defense counsel to fully brief every client on every likely
effect of a plea in all circumstances." 164 The 1999 Standards fail to address a
prevalent situation-particularly common with misdemeanors and other
low-level charges-where an individual is forced to make a quick decision
about a plea bargain after meeting his counsel for the first time. Given the
trust barriers that many individuals have with a lawyer they have never seen
before, the individual is likely to withhold personal information (such as
immigration status) necessary for determining serious or likely
consequences. Even if this does not happen, given the time constraints
imposed by full court dockets and high defense-counsel caseloads, there will
be insufficient time at a first appearance to undertake anything but the most
cursory explanation of penal consequences. In such a situation, under the
2003 Standards, one could argue that full warnings are not "possible," and
thus, the failures of the system will drive the rule's interpretation.
In short, while the ABA Standards on counsel's duty to warn about nonpenal consequences have substance, they also have flaws. More importantly,
professional standards, standing alone, lack any mechanism to enforce their
mandates. Thus, the ABA has described its organization's often-cited
Standards for Criminal Justice as "a considered collection of 'best practices'
for the criminal justice system, aspirational targets that an experienced
group of prosecutors, defenders and judges have agreed upon."165 This
deficiency is illustrated by what is perhaps the greatest limitation of the 2003

162.

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY

§ 14-3.2(f).

Although

this

Standard (with its vague "to the extent possible" language) sounds rather weak, the
commentary reveals a more rigorous intention. The drafters note how courts distinguish
between direct and collateral consequences, and consequently require little in the way of
warnings. They go on to state that this provision "strives to set an appropriately high standard,
providing that defense counsel should be familiar with, and advise defendants of, all of the
possible effects of conviction." Id. § 14-3.2(f) cmt. The commentary specifically mentions, as
examples, immigration consequences and consequences of drug and sex-offense convictions.
Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Brief Amicus Curiae of the ABA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Fellers v.
United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004) (No. 02-6320), 2003 WL 21673769, at *2.

95 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2009]

Standards, namely their explicit rejection of guilty-plea withdrawals when
counsel breaches his or her duty to advise.166 This is similar to the many
state statutes and court rules that require a warning and then render it
167
essentially toothless by explicitly exempting the only meaningful remedy.
As one commentator noted with respect to this provision, "By carving out
such large exceptions to its most powerful mandates, the Standards threaten
to doom themselves to irrelevance." 168 The 1999 Standards had no such
express anti-enforcement clause, instead remaining silent on any remedy for
a violation of the duty to warn.
In the recently approved Uniforn Act on Collateral Consequences of
Convictions (the Act), the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws also explicitly disavowed any enforcement mechanism
for failure to follow its advisement mandate. 169 In a section entitled
"Limitation on Scope," the Act unequivocally states that it "does not provide
a basis for: (1) invalidating a plea, conviction, or sentence; (2) a cause of
action for money damages; or (3) a claim for relief from or defense to the
application of a collateral consequence based on a failure to comply with
[various sections of the Act, including advisement]." 170 In addition, the Act

166. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS § 19-2.3(b) ("Failure of the court or counsel to
inform the defendant of applicable collateral sanctions shall not be a basis for withdrawing the
plea of guilty, except where otherwise provided by law or rules of procedure, or where the
failure renders the plea constitutionally invalid.").
167. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (describing different state statutes).
168. Smyth, supra note 156, at 493 (noting how the Standards' explicit bar on plea
withdrawal as a remedy for failure to warn is a "fundamental exception" which "undercuts their
power.... With this small provision the Standards replicate the most damaging legal distinction
between 'collateral' and 'direct' consequences").
169. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 3 (Draft for Approval
2009) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2009am-approved.pdf
(draft approved on July 15, 2009: Press Release, Unif. Law Comm'n, New Act Addresses
Consequences of Criminal Sentencing (July 15, 2009), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Desktop
Modules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ltemlD=217). Although the Act follows the ABA in separating
automatic from discretionary consequences, see id. § 2, it does not distinguish between these two
categories in its advisement section, with the result being that the scope of advisement is much
broader than under the ABA. Id. §§ 5-6. The Act does limit the types of consequences which
require advisement. Perhaps most significantly, it fails to even mention advisement of any type
of sexual-offender consequence, such as registration or the possibility of involuntary civil
commitment as a "sexually violent predator." See id. (including, in a non-exclusive list,
advisement mandates for the possible inability to obtain certain licenses, permits, jobs, public
housing or educational resources; the possibility of a higher sentence if convicted of another
crime, or governmental taking of property; prohibitions on voting rights and possession of a
firearm; and a variety of immigration consequences). Indeed, the Act specifically exempts
sexual-offender registration from the list of consequences that would qualify for an Order of
Limited Relief or a Certificate of Restoration of Rights under other sections of the Act. See id.
§11.
170. Id. § 3.
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states that it "does not affect.., the duty an individual's attorney owes to the
individual." 171
Although professional standards on their own may not adequately affect
defense-counsel behavior, such standards are also woven into the
constitutional landscape. "[The Sixth Amendment] relies ...on the legal
profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that
the Amendment envisions." 172 In explaining the first prong of the test for
ineffective assistance of counsel (attorney-competence inquiry under a
reasonableness standard), the Supreme Court stated in Strickland v.
Washington that "[p] revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards and the like ...are guides to determining what is
reasonable, but they are only guides." 173 Some twenty years later, in another
ineffective-assistance case, the Court excerpted Stricklands language to place
greater emphasis on those same professional standards: "Counsel's conduct
...fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the
American Bar Association (ABA)-standards to which we long have referred
174
as 'guides to determining what is reasonable."'
As yet, the Supreme Court has not incorporated professional standards
into its norms governing any duty for defense counsel to warn about
collateral consequences; indeed, the Court has yet to directly take up the
question of such a duty (but may do so in Padilla). If the Court were to find
such a duty and were it to rely on existing professional standards in
articulating that duty, there would be a constitutional enforcement
mechanism for such standards through Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Unless and until the Court acts, however, the current force of the standards
is almost non-existent.

Id.
171.
172. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (noting that "[tihe proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms," and referencing the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (holding that "[c]ounsel's decision not to expand their investigation ...

fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989," and noting that
"standard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins' trial included the
preparation of a social history report"); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001) (noting
that "competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, would have
advised" the defendant about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea).
173. Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
174.
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). As one commentator
noted, discussing how the ABA Standards have been more robustly incorporated into
I]
ineffective assistance jurisprudence, "[ tis ...a positive development systematically because
the acceptance of the Guidelines as professional norms draws lawyers attention to specific
duties and tasks which are integral to effective representation." John H. Blume & Stacey D.
Neumann, "It's Like DiJt1 Vu All Over Again". Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v.
Beard and a (Partial)Return to the GuidelinesApproach to the Effective Assistance of Counse4 34 Am.J.
CRiM. L. 127, 159 (2007).
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This is not to say that attorneys and defender offices will completely
ignore professional standards. Indeed, state bar associations sometimes
incorporate them when interpreting binding state ethics rules. 175 However,
the current iteration of the rules governing the duty to advise have limited
impact because they are narrow, are non-binding, exclude many potentially
serious collateral consequences, and lack enforcement potential. Combined
with the lower courts' misguided constitutional stamp of approval on
silence, these rules and standards do not properly encourage the significant,
and much-needed, changes to the current culture of non-advisement about
collateral consequences.
The way to give these prevailing standards real meaning is for the
Supreme Court to incorporate them into a Sixth Amendment duty to warn.
5.

Local Practice and Office Guidelines

In addition to court rules and national professional standards,
practitioner behavior is shaped by local practice and office guidelines. For
example, certain public-defender systems have written standards that
address the duty to advise defendants about collateral consequences as part
of the plea-counseling process. 176 These local standards, if there is a cultural
acceptance of the practices they endorse, may have a greater influence than
national professional standards, with which many attorneys may not be
familiar.
Perhaps most important, in terms of the likelihood of influencing
behavior, is local practice-specifically, a given jurisdiction's unwritten
norms of defense-counsel, prosecutorial, or judicial conduct particular to a
certain jurisdiction. For example, court rules in a particular jurisdiction may
not require judges to warn defendants about the registration consequences
of sex-offense convictions. However, judges in that court may, as a matter of
best practice, choose to offer such warnings. Informal local practice
regarding collateral consequences is probably most common at certain large
177
defender offices with the ability to devote specific resources to such issues

175. See supra note 134. But see supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (noting how state
disciplinary boards rarely pursue charges against criminal defense attorneys).
176. See, e.g., GA. PUB. DEFENDER STANDARDS, supra note 114; LA. PUB. DEFENDERS ASS'N,
REFORM: THE LOUISIANA PUBLIC DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNCIL § 6.D(A), (A)(b) (2006),

available at http://www.lapda.org/PDF%20Files/LaPDSC%2OSecond%2OEdition%20Jan%
202006%20FINAL.pdf ("Prior to the entry of the plea, counsel should... make certain that the
client receives a full explanation of... sanctions and collateral consequences the client will be
exposed to by entering a plea."); see also ABA COMM'N ON EFFECTIVE CRIM. SANCTIONS, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2007), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/

commupload/CR209800/newsletterpubs/Report.V.PDF.121306.pdf ("[T]he American Bar
Association urges federal, state, territorial, and local governments to encourage prosecutors to
inform themselves of the collateral consequences that may apply in particular cases.").
177. For example, the Santa Clara Public Defender notes:
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or in other offices that pursue a holistic approach to criminal-defense
practice. 178 Such high standards of practice are critical in breaking the path
to endorsement of those practices in national or state professional
standards. 179 These demanding standards also provide an important training
component for the attorneys who practice under them, even long after those
attorneys leave the particular office or jurisdiction.
However, local practice is uneven, non-binding, and always subject to
change. If a public defender's office loses funding, it might, for example, cut
back on collateral-consequences training that it had previously supported. In
addition, many jurisdictions do not have an organized public defender's
office. Instead, they rely on assigned counsel plans, where the jurisdiction
pays individual lawyers to represent indigent defendants, or contract bids,
where one attorney or group of attorneys handle a large percentage of the
cases.180 In these jurisdictions, there is no institutional defender and the
assigned attorneys are dispersed throughout different offices. Without a
central office, it is difficult to offer training making defenders aware of
collateral consequences and helping them incorporate that knowledge into
their practices. 181
6.

Reputational Effects

Informal regulatory mechanisms for defense-counsel behavior, namely
concerns about reputation, are much more likely to influence behavior than
the formal approaches described above. On the one hand, most defense
lawyers want to offer high-quality representation, which would support

[I]t is important to obtain legal advice from criminal defense counsel and/or
immigration counsel regarding the immigration consequences of any pending
criminal matter. The Santa Clara County Office of the Public Defender has an
immigration attorney that can assist public defender clients in understanding the
immigration consequences which may result from a criminal conviction.
County of Santa Clara, Office of the Pub. Defender, Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions, http://www.sccgov.org/portal/site/opd/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
178. See, e.g., MARK STEPHENS, ORIGINS OF THE COMMUNITY LAW OFFICE 19-22 (2008),
available

at

http://www.pdknox.org/Downloadable/Michigan.zip

(describing

holistic

representation in Knoxville, Tennessee); The Bronx Defenders, Our Practice, http://www.
bronxdefenders.org/?page=content&param=ourpractice
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009)
("[H]olistic defense means that clients ... have one place where they can go for any issue,
whether it is a case in a courtroom, a problem with a landlord, or a long-standing mental
illness.").
179. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (describing how professional standards
and local practice are woven into the constitutional landscape of effective assistance).
180. See GIDEONCs BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 94, at 2 (describing the three principle ways
in which legal services are provided to indigent criminal defendants in the United States).
181. To be sure, there are some important movements to spread the word on these
consequences beyond committed defender offices. See, e.g., N.Y. State Defenders Ass'n, Defense
Training Calendar, http://www.nysda.org/Training/TrainingCalendars/training-calendars.
html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (listing classes addressing collateral consequences).
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counseling regarding non-penal consequences. Related is the desire to avoid
a reputation as a corner-cutting lawyer who has not availed himself or herself
of the growing opportunities for education about the collateral
consequences of criminal convictions. 18 2 Still, some defense lawyers reject

such a holistic approach and accept the more traditional (and still quite
prevalent) view that defense counsel need only be an expert in the narrow,
immediate criminal case. 183 In addition to concerns about giving erroneous
advice, this limited-expert attitude may lead to silence about collateral
consequences. For example, traditional defenders may consider the cost of
time that it takes to gain the needed expertise in the particular area, as well
as the time needed to discuss the issues with their clients and deem them
184
outside their required service.
On the other hand, a concern about reputation in one's relevant
community could lead defense lawyers to play it safe and stick closely to the
jurisdiction's formal, mandatory rules. The current constitutional standard,
the only formal rule binding defense counsel, advocates silence in cases
involving collateral consequences.
7.

Malpractice

In addition to avenues that could lead to plea withdrawal, a defendant
might sue his criminal defense counsel in tort for providing erroneous
information about one or more collateral consequences of his criminal
conviction. However, such civil malpractice lawsuits pose significant legal
and practical hurdles for defendants. One commentator has noted that
"criminal malpractice actions are so difficult to win that, for the most part,
criminal defense attorneys enjoy special protection from civil liability for
185
substandard conduct."
Further, a civil tort remedy-like discipline of a defense lawyer under
ethical rules-cannot get a defendant what he really wants: namely,
withdrawal of his guilty plea. Available civil remedies do not matter much to
a defendant who will be deported or civilly committed as a result of a plea
that he entered without awareness of the consequences. Still, similar to the
potential label of "ineffective assistance," defense counsel operates to some
182. See supra notes 114, 181 (describing examples of such opportunities).
183. See Robin Steinberg & David Feige, CulturalRevolution: Transformingthe Public Defender's
Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 123-24 (2004) (describing the "traditional
defender office" as, among other things, "lawyer-driven and case-oriented," where "defenders
address themselves primarily to the client's immediate legal needs believing that removing or
reducing the imminent threat of incarceration is their function.... Once the case is over, so is
the relationship with the client-at least until the next arrest.").
184. But see Pinard, supra note 112, at 1088-90 (recognizing this concern, but noting how
counseling about collateral consequences could quickly and fairly easily become an integrated
component of client counseling).
185. Meredith J. Duncan, CriminalMalpractice:A Lawyer's Holiday, 37 GA. L. REV. 1251, 1255
(2003).
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extent in the shadow of the malpractice lawsuit. Therefore, tort law may
influence counsel's behavior.
The basic claim of professional negligence or malpractice applies in the
criminal-defense context. 8 6 While such claims raise issues of state tort law,
which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, some general rules illustrate the
potential for a claim of malpractice based on counsel's failure to advise, or
counsel's misadvice, about collateral consequences. Counsel "is considered
negligent if he fails to exercise the knowledge and the degree of care and
skill ordinarily adequate and appropriate to the matter he undertakes to
handle." 187 This standard for malpractice is similar, in many respects, to the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires demonstrating
that the attorney performed below accepted norms.188 As discussed in Part
II.A, courts have almost uniformly held that failure to advise about collateral
consequences does not constitute ineffective assistance. Since dismissal of a
defendant's claim for ineffective assistance for failure to warn will often lead
to collateral estoppel of any claim of civil malpractice, 89 courts give defense
counsel the message that silence offers immunity from malpractice, whereas
advice runs the risk of becoming affirmative misadvice, and therefore the
loss of such immunity.
Even if a plaintiff wins a claim of ineffective assistance against his
former defense counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, this does not
ensure success in a civil claim for malpractice. In some jurisdictions, a guilty
plea can foreclose any civil remedy. 190 In many others, a plaintiff must prove
his actual innocence on the underlying criminal charges, in addition to
attorney negligence, to succeed in the civil case. 19 1 Finally, in some states
public defenders and appointed defense counsel may be immune from state
tort liability. 192

186.

7 AM.JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 213 (2007).

187.

14 AM.JUR. TRIALs 265 (1968).

188.
189.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the Strickland test).
See, e.g., Zeidwick v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989). The Zeidwick court held:
[W]here a defendant in a criminal case has had a full and fair opportunity to
present his claim in a prior criminal proceeding, and a judicial determination is
made that he has received the effective assistance of counsel, then the
defendant/attorney in a subsequent civil malpractice action brought by the
criminal defendant may defensively assert collateral estoppel.

Id.
190.

See Gregory G. Sarno, Legal Malpractice in Defense of Criminal Prosecution, 4 A.L.R.5th

273, § 4 (1992) (discussing the effects of a valid guilty plea).
191.
See, e.g., Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 P.3d 670, 672 (Cal. 2001) ("In a legal
malpractice case arising out of a criminal proceeding, California, like most jurisdictions, also
requires proof of actual innocence."); see also id. at 673 (listing various public-policy
considerations for an "actual innocence" requirement in malpractice cases).
192. See, e.g., Morgano v. Smith, 879 P,2d 735, 736-37 (Nev. 1994) (citing a state statute that
holds that a "public defender is immune from suit for malpractice arising out of discretionary
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Successful malpractice actions against criminal defense attorneys are
rare for the reasons mentioned as well as many others, 193 but they are not
unheard of. To some extent the possibility of defending against such a
lawsuit will influence counsel's actions. Against this backdrop, the message
to counsel is that they may be liable for malpractice if they misadvise, but
collateral estoppel will protect them if they simply fail to advise about any
and all collateral consequences.
The intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and the affirmativemisinformation exception pits norms of good lawyering and transparency
for defendants against the strong pull of finality and efficiency, the
avoidance of ineffective assistance or some other label, and the unfortunate
realities of high-volume criminal practice. It also pits evolving professional
standards and court rules against the lagging constitutional rule. With the
lower courts' current constitutional stamp of approval on total failures to
warn, many defense lawyers, judges, and prosecutors may choose to steer
entirely clear of warnings about collateral consequences. In other words,
94
they may choose silence. 1

decisions made pursuant to his or her duties as a public defender" and explaining that the same
rule applies to court-appointed counsel). But see Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa.
1979). The Reese court stated:
While the availability of court-appointed counsel to represent indigents is
indubitably the public business, we hold that once the appointment of a public
defender in a given case is made, his public or state function ceases and thereafter
he functions purely as a private attorney concerned with servicing his client.
Id. Federal law does not provide federal public defenders with immunity from a state-law
malpractice suit brought by a former client. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979). In
addition, state public defenders do not act "under color of state law" when performing a
lawyer's traditional functions, and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
193.
For example, civil practitioners may hesitate to accept a malpractice action brought by
a former criminal defendant because such actions are both difficult to win and may result in
little to no damages. Often, then, defendants must proceed pro se. This is particularly onerous
for incarcerated defendants. In addition, with prospects for damages limited and with no
potential for the remedy the defendant may really want-plea withdrawal-there is often little
incentive for defendants to pursue such actions.
194.
Imagine a training on the collateral consequences of criminal convictions, organized
to educate criminal defense attorneys on the most common non-penal consequences that their
clients may face if convicted. The speaker summarizes the effect of various convictions in the
areas of immigration, housing, public benefits, family law, and employment. One participant,
perhaps concerned because she is not an expert in these other areas, thanks the speaker for the
helpful information but then asks: "Do I have to warn all of my non-citizen clients about the
potential immigration consequences of any guilty plea? What about housing consequences?
What happens if I don't warn them?" The speaker pauses, and then responds as follows: "Well,
of course you should warn non-citizen clients about possible deportation and of course you
should warn clients in (or with families in) public housing that certain convictions will
jeopardize that. But you should also know that under the current constitutional law of
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IV. THE VARIOUS RATIONALES FOR THE AFFIRMAT1VE-MISADVICE
EXCEPTION ALSO APPLY TO THE FAILURE TO WARN

Substantial practical problems of interpretation and implementation,
discussed in Part II.B, plague the current approach, which differentiates
between silence and misinformation. There are also significant doctrinal
flaws associated with courts accepting the collateral-consequences rule, both
with and without recognition of an affirmative-misadvice exception. This
Part first explores those flaws and then weighs the various potential
rationales for differentiating between silence and misadvice against the costs
of such an approach.
A.

THE BRIGHT LINES OF THE COLLATERAL-CONSEQUENCES RULE AND

AFFIRMATIVE-MISREPRESENTA TIONEXCEPTIONARE DOCTRINALLY UNSOUND

The roots of the affirmative-misadvice exception seem to lie in
misrepresentations about direct consequences. 195 For example, Caroll
Rumery's lawyer told him that he faced a maximum penalty of thirty years if
convicted of what the lawyer erroneously interpreted to be three counts in
the indictment. In fact, the indictment charged only one crime carrying a
maximum penalty of five years. After hearing this incorrect advice about
maximum penalties, Mr. Rumery pleaded guilty to the only count charged
and was sentenced to the five-year maximum (although he believed at the
time that this was significantly below the maximum). 196 Under any
definition of "direct consequence," this advice clearly qualified, since it
concerned the ability of a trial court to impose a particular sentence.
Because of this, the Fifth Circuit found ineffective assistance of counsel

advisement, you might be safer remaining silent, because if you attempt to warn your client and
you turn out to be wrong about that particular consequence, you may later be on the receiving
end of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel ruling. There might be other repercussions, such as a
malpractice claim if you give erroneous advice. But if you stay silent, you are pretty safe."
Under current Kentucky law, a speaker in that state might say: "You can go ahead and
say whatever you want because even advice that's wrong won't be ineffective. Your state
criminal-procedure rules probably require the judge to warn the client about immigration
consequences, but they don't say anything about housing, and in any case, that's the judge and
not you. You should know that there are some professional standards that recommend warnings
on various consequences, but not all of them, and in any case, these are not binding on you."
195. See People v. Ensor, 149 N.E. 737, 738-39 (Ill. 1925) (recognizing rule that whether
defendant can withdraw guilty plea is discretionary with the trial court with some exceptions,
including "[w] here it appears that a plea of guilty was entered through a misapprehension of
the facts or the law"); People v. Bonheim, 138 N.E. 627, 628 (Ill. 1923) (examining Bonheim's
claim that he was misled into believing that a guilty plea would lead to a sentence of probation
and noting that "where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered through a
misapprehension of the facts or the law, or in consequence of misrepresentation by his counsel
or the state's attorney.., the court should permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty").
196. United States v. Rumery, 698 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 1983).
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leading to an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea, which Rumery was
97
allowed to withdraw. 1
The more recent misadvice decisions, however, branch over into
consequences already labeled "collateral" by the courts. These decisions
evince a perfectly understandable concern about allegations of officers of
the court misinforming defendants about something as severe-and as
critical to the process of deciding whether to enter a guilty plea-as
deportation. One judge expressed this concern by stating that "[c]ounsel
who gives erroneous advice [about deportation] to a client which influences
198
a felony conviction is worse than no lawyer at all."
Yet these same jurisdictions rely on the collateral-consequences rule and
have thus chosen to draw a bright line between direct and collateral
consequences with respect to defense counsel's duty to warn. Working from
(but not agreeing with) this strict categorization, it is doctrinally inconsistent
for these same courts to blur the bright line and find that erroneous
information about collateral consequences violates the relevant
constitutional norms. For example, the consequences of enduring potential
lifetime civil commitment or deportation with separation from home, family,
and livelihood are "collateral," if one accepts the widespread, prevailing
definition of that term. 199 Yet if a defendant received no information or
erroneous information about these severe consequences prior to pleading
guilty, he did not have the necessary and accurate information to make a
truly informed and intelligent plea. In both situations, the person still faces
the same consequence. The only factor that has changed is the actual
"collateral" information that flowed from the defense lawyer, the court, or
the prosecutor to that person. Instead of a total lack of information, the
defendant now has erroneous information.
The Russell and Roberti decisions, discussed in the Introduction and Part
II, respectively, illustrate this predominant and doctrinally inconsistent
approach. They deemed misadvice about collateral consequences during the
guilty-plea process a potential constitutional violation, but did not deem a
total failure to warn as such. 20 0 This approach is not flawed because of the
misadvice exception, but rather fails at its inception, with acceptance of the
flawed collateral consequences doctrine and its indefensible bright line in

197. Id. (finding ineffective assistance of counsel where "[c]ounsel erroneously advised
defendant that he was charged with three separate counts and could receive a prison term of
thirty years," and stating that "[appellant's guilty plea, based as it was upon the erroneous
expectation that it reduced his maximum potential sentence from thirty years to five years, was
not knowingly and intelligently made").
198. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008) (Cunningham, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009).
199. See supra note 154 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's often-cited definition)
200. It is a potential violation because of the prejudice requirement for ineffectiveness
claims. See supra note 21 (describing prejudice-prong test).
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an area of law-effective assistance of counsel-that is instead fact
201
sensitive.
At first blush, the Kentucky Supreme Court's recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Padilla appears to offer a rare example of a doctrinally
consistent approach to the rule and its exception in the context of defensecounsel warnings. 20 2 However, closer examination of the case reveals both
doctrinal failure and a disturbing lack of concern with the message the
court's approach sends to defense lawyers. Jose Padilla lived in the United
States for decades and served in the military during the Vietnam War before
he pleaded guilty to marijuana trafficking and received a sentence of five
years in prison followed by probation. 20 3 In a short opinion, the court
rejected Padilla's claim that due to his attorney's misadvice-namely, that he
would not be deported based upon his guilty plea because he had been in
the United States for so many years-he received constitutionally ineffective
counsel and should be able to withdraw his plea. The court cited its previous
decision in Commonwealth v. Fuartado, "which determined that collateral
consequences are outside the scope of representation required by the Sixth
Amendment and that failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant of
possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel." 20 4 Padilla then extended this analysis one
step further, finding that:
[I]t follows that counsel's failure to advise Appellee of such
collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly provides
no basis for relief. In neither instance is the matter required to be
addressed by counsel, and so an attorney's failure in that regard
cannot constitute ineffectiveness entitling a criminal defendant to
20 5
relief under Strickland v. Washington.
In short, the court decided it was "too bad" for Mr. Padilla-whose lawyer,
after all, didn't have a duty to discuss deportation with him in the first place.
Padilla is one of only a few decisions taking the approach that
consequences deemed collateral remain so even when the defendant's own
attorney gives erroneous advice about them. 20 6 The court's adherence to the

201.

See infra notes 211-14, 246 and accompanying text (discussing Stricklands insistence

on review of the particular facts of each claim of ineffectiveness).
202. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482.
203. Id. at 483.
204. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005)).
205. Id. at 485.
206. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Padilla). Another such case was United States v. Parrino,where the defense
lawyer, a former Commissioner of Immigration, signed an affidavit admitting that he gave
Parrino erroneous advice about deportation. United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921 (2d
Cir. 1954). Despite this, and despite noting "the terrific impact on the defendant's life and
family of the collateral consequence of deportation," id. at 922, and conceding that deportation
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bright line dividing direct from collateral makes the decision appear
consistent. Closer examination of Padilla's and Fuartado's reasoning,
however, reveals the Kentucky approach's doctrinal flaws. In Fuartado,the
court noted that other jurisdictions categorized deportation as a collateral
consequence and thus found no duty for defense counsel to warn about
it. 20 7 It then explored two interrelated reasons "behind these opinions": (1)
"that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses criminal
prosecutions only, and does not extend to requiring counsel on collateral
consequences that may result from such proceedings"; and (2) "The
constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel, therefore,
extends to and encompasses only those activities which tend to protect a
criminal defendant's right to a fair and intelligent determination of guilt or
innocence."208 Neither line of reasoning withstands scrutiny.
While it is true that the Sixth Amendment does not extend to civil
proceedings, 2° the court's first reason is flawed. When a criminal defense
lawyer warns a client about collateral consequences of a criminal conviction,
it does not mean that lawyer is representing the client in the non-criminal
matter. The warning comes in the context of a lawyer counseling her client
about the pros and cons of pleading guilty versus going to trial in the
criminal case. This counseling seeks to give an individual the information
that the individual decides (along with counsel) that he needs to make an
informed decision, and it is squarely within the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment. 210 Courts cannot simply pluck moments of that critical
conversation out of the sphere of the Sixth Amendment.

rested on the fact of the conviction, the Second Circuit deemed Parrino's deportation
collateral. Id. Technically, the court held that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (d),
governing plea withdrawals in federal court, Parrino failed to show "manifest injustice." Id.

However, the Second Circuit recently found that misadvice about deportation could constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel, effectively overruling Parrino.See United States v. Couto, 311
F.3d 179,

188 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[A]n

affirmative misrepresentation

by counsel as to the

deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasonable."). Kentucky courts
have begun to cite the PadiUadecision in denying claims involving misadvice. See, e.g., Cowherd
v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-000835-MR, 2009 WL 1636360, at *2-3 (Ky. Ct. App. June 12,
2009) (discussing Padilla in denying Cowherd's claim that his counsel misadvised him about
state law that required Cowherd to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before becoming
eligible for parole, despite the fact that counsel testified at an evidentiary hearing that had he
known the law, "he strongly believed he would not have advised Cowherd to enter his plea").
207. Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005).
208. Id.
209. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) (noting "the
presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is
unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom").
210. See Patterson v. LeMaster, 21 P.3d 1032, 1036 (N.M. 2001) ("Effective assistance of
counsel is necessary during plea negotiations because the most important decision for a
defendant in a criminal case is generally whether to contest a charge or enter into a plea
agreement.").

IGNORANCE IS EFFECTIVELY BLISS

The second reason is also flawed on several grounds. The touchstone
for the right to effective assistance is the right to a fair adjudication, 2 11 but
the Supreme Court has never held that only conversations about guilt or
innocence are constitutionally required when an attorney counsels a client
about the case against him. Rather, the Court has been careful to note that
"specific guidelines" are not appropriate in determining whether "counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."2 1 2 In
evaluating reasonableness, the Court relies instead on prevailing
professional norms. 213 Indeed, Fuartado recognized that in the guilty-plea
context, the right to a just determination "is extended to include
investigating and advising the criminal defendant on all aspects of the plea
and the direct consequences thereof."2 1 4 Fuartadowent on to state that this
encompassed "the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plea, the
availability of substantial defenses, the loss of several fundamental
constitutional rights, and the punishment that may be imposed by the trial
court." 215 Yet not all items on this list go directly to guilt or innocence. For
example, knowledge that a guilty plea could result in a certain number of
years in prison does not speak to guilt or innocence, but rather to the
recognition that an individual facing criminal charges needs the assistance
of counsel to understand this important information. 216 Along with just
adjudications, a core purpose of the right to effective assistance is ensuring
that an individual makes a voluntary, informed decision about whether to
plead guilty. Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has never attempted- to
delineate items that would or would not fit that purpose, choosing instead to
examine the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
Additionally, the second Fuartado rationale incorrectly relied on case
law applying the Fifth Amendment and overlooked relevant Sixth
Amendment Supreme Court precedent. Fuartadocited the Supreme Court
case of Brady v. United States in support of its bright-line finding that
211. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("[T]he purpose of the effective
assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is... to ensure that criminal defendants receive a
fair trial."); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (stating that the right to counsel
applies in the context of guilty pleas).
212. Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
213. Id.; see also supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (explaining how courts rely on
professional standards).
214. Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005).
215. Id.
216. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n.6 (1970) (noting "[t]he importance of
assuring that a defendant does not plead guilty except with a full understanding of the charges
against him and the possible consequences of his plea"); see also Peter Westen & David Westin, A
Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REV. 471, 504-05 (1978)
(explaining the requirement that the defendant be informed of possible sentence before
pleading guilty "does not help him in assessing his own guilt or innocence," but rather can be
explained by "the defendant's interest in being given the information he needs in order to
choose what is 'best for himself'").
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counsel's constitutional role in advising defendants about guilty pleas
extends only to "the direct consequences thereof."217 However, Brady
examined a claim of a Fifth Amendment due-process violation and resulted
in the Court "holding that Brady's plea was not compelled even though the
218
law promised him a lesser maximum penalty if he did not go to trial."
Brady brought no Sixth Amendment claim before the Court; indeed, the
decision found that Brady "had competent counsel and full opportunity to
assess the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with those
attending a plea of guilty." 2 19 Furthermore, no issue involving collateral
consequences was before the Court in Brady. When the Court confronted a
claim of an invalid guilty plea based on pre-plea misadvice from defense
counsel about a collateral consequence in Hill v. Lockhart, it ignored Brady's
Fifth Amendment voluntariness test and instead applied Stricklands twopronged Sixth Amendment test.22° This cuts squarely against Fuartado'sand
Padilla's claim that examination of counsel's failure to warn or misadvise
about a collateral consequence does not fall within the Sixth Amendment.
In short, the Kentucky decisions got the law wrong.
A third flaw in the Kentucky courts' reasoning is that both decisions
completely ignore the reality of criminal practice, which often does take
collateral consequences into account in both plea bargaining and
sentencing. The former President of the National District Attorneys
Association wrote that prosecutors "must consider [collateral consequences]
if we are to see that justice is done" and asked: "How can we ignore a
consequence of our prosecution that we know will surely be imposed by the
operation of law?" 22 1 As criminal-defense practitioners who incorporate
their knowledge about collateral consequences into their plea negotiations
know, prosecutors are increasingly aware of the plethora of collateral
consequences of criminal convictions. They also know that prosecutors may
be amenable to taking applicable consequences into account when
negotiating the punishment aspect of a plea bargain or offering a bargain
that, in the appropriate case, allows a person to avoid an unjustly harsh
collateral consequence. 222 The San Francisco Public Defender has noted:
217.

Fuartado,170 S.W.3d at 386.

218.

Brady, 397 U.S. 742, at 754. For a critique of the doctrinal origins of "direct

consequences" language in Brady, see Roberts, supranote 15, at 684-89.
219. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754.
220. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985).
221.

Robert M.A.Johnson, Messageftom the President,PROSECUTOR, May-June 2001, at 5, 5.

222.

See, e.g., Smyth, supra note 156, at 494-95. Smyth states:
[P]rosecutors and judges respond best to consequences that offend their basic
sense of fairness-consequences that are absurd or disproportionate or that affect
innocent family members. Four major categories of hidden punishments provide
the most leverage: (1) housing (loss of public housing or Section 8 housing); (2)
employment (loss of a job or employment license, particularly for the primary
breadwinner); (3) student loans; and (4) immigration.
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"[My] office regards a defendant's immigration status as an
important factor to be considered in determining the appropriate
plea bargain for one's client." Accordingly, the ... office imposes

on its staff attorneys, under its "Minimum Standards of
Representation," the duty to ascertain "what the impact of the case
223
may have on [the client's] immigration status in this country."
Similarly, judges may agree to accept a negotiated bargain if made aware of
the collateral consequences that entered into the cost-benefit analysis for
both the defense and prosecution. Judges will also directly consider nonpenal consequences in determining appropriate punishment.224
Finally, as noted in the Introduction, a rule that allows for both silence
and misadvice about collateral consequences sends the worst sort of
message. It tells defense lawyers they can fail to inform their client about
consequences that might significantly affect their client in major aspects of
his life. At the same time, it tells lawyers that if they do attempt to warn their
clients about collateral consequences, then there is no need to take much
care in investigating the particular consequence at issue because any
erroneous information they offer-no matter how egregious the error or
consequential the results-is not of constitutional significance. Worse, this
allows a defense lawyer to induce a plea that the lawyer wanted the client to
take (for reasons of efficiency, time management, etc.) by giving the client
false information that convinces him that a particular collateral
225
consequence will not come to pass as a result of the plea.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, applying federal constitutional law in
State v. Paredez, also treated defense counsel's silence the same as
misadvice. 22 6 However, it arrived at the opposite conclusion from Padilla.As
described in Part III.A, Paredezheld defense counsel has a Sixth Amendment
duty to affirmatively, and correctly, advise clients about the immigration
consequences of any guilty plea. 227 The court thus applied Stricklands twopart ineffective-assistance test to Paredez's claim of misadvice by his defense
attorney.228 The way in which Paredez applied the test, however, is somewhat
unique. Paredez first made an interesting move when it joined the Second
Id.
223. People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (alteration in original)
(citing an amicus brief from the San Francisco Public Defender).
224. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 49, at 722-23 (describing various ways in which judges
can and do take collateral consequences into account in sentencing determinations).
225. See note 12 and accompanying text (quoting PadillaPetition for Certiorari). While one
would certainly hope that such a situation would not arise, the Padilla approach does allow for
it. The idea that the Constitution would allow a guilty plea under such circumstances (even if
such behavior would potentially allow for a malpractice claim or bar association disciplinary
action against counsel) is unacceptable.
226. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004).
227. Id. at 805.
228. Id. at 804.
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Circuit in holding "that 'an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively
unreasonable.' 229 It then extended this holding to non-advice. 230 The court
was quite specific in setting out counsel's responsibilities:
We hold that criminal defense attorneys are obligated to determine
the immigration status of their clients. If a client is a non-citizen,
the attorney must advise that client of the specific immigration
consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation
would be virtually certain. Proper advice will allow the defendant to
make a knowing and voluntary decision to plead guilty. ... An
attorney's failure to provide the required advice regarding
immigration consequences will be ineffective assistance of counsel if
the defendant suffers prejudice by the attorney's omission. 231
There are two important elements to consider from this holding: first,
the recognition that the Strickland test, rather than a due-process framework,
is the correct test for failures to warn; and second, the finding of per se
unreasonableness under prong one of Strickland for both defense-counsel
misadvice and for failure to warn about deportation. 232 This first element
should be fairly uncontroversial. As noted above, other courts' reliance on
Brady's Fifth Amendment voluntariness test when examining claims of
counsels' failures is misplaced and directly contradicts the Supreme Court's
ruling in Hill.
The application of a per se unreasonableness rule is more complicated,
and Paredez does not adequately explain its reasoning. While meeting the
first prong of the ineffective-assistance test requires demonstrating

229. Id. (quoting United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002)).
230. Id.
231. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805 (emphases added). Since the case was on direct appeal and
there was not yet a fully-developed record of defense counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the
Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing at which Paredez could prove what the
high court characterized as "a distinct possibility that [his] attorney failed to adequately inform
him of the immigration consequences of his plea, and [that] if [he] had been properly advised,
he would not have pleaded guilty." Id. at 806.
232. The Supreme Court has recognized a limited class of ineffective-assistance cases where
it is appropriate to presume prejudice under Stricklands second prong. Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175, 177 (2004) (noting Cronic's per se prejudice standard is "reserved for situations in
which counsel has entirely failed to function as the client's advocate," and finding that defense
counsel's strategy of conceding defendant's guilt, without the defendant's consent, did not
constitute per se prejudice); see, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657-62 (1984)
(noting the prejudice prong is presumed where counsel's actions-or lack thereof-constitutes
an actual breakdown of the adversarial process at trial); Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609, 61617 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding a presumption of prejudice where defendant's counsel failed to
move to suppress defendant's confession). However, the Supreme Court has never applied such
a per se rule to the attorney-competence prong. Rather, it has insisted on a case-by-case analysis
under the particular circumstances of the case. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696
(1984).
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objectively unreasonable representation by defense counsel, the Supreme
Court has cautioned that there is no checklist for what counsel must or
cannot do and instead courts should consider "all of the circumstances" of
the particular case. 233 In doing this, Strickland requires that courts reviewing
ineffectiveness claims be "highly deferential" to defense counsel to avoid
second-guessing what might be legitimate case strategy. 234 It thus requires
that defendants "overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." 235 Paredez
noted this aspect of the Strickland framework, 236 but did not explain why it
chose to rely instead on a per se rule. Implicit in the New Mexico Supreme
Court's holding, however, is that neither misadvice nor the failure to warn
about deportation can ever be strategic, and thus neither are ever
reasonable. Indeed, Paredez noted the particular harshness of deportation,
how it often overshadows concerns about any penal sentence in lower-level
238
cases, 237 and how, in many cases, it is "virtually automatic."
As applied to misadvice, the per se approach should not draw much
disagreement. It is hard to imagine a strategic reason for misadvising about
deportation. The only explanations would be good-faith error, negligence in
failing to research the matter properly, or intentional manipulation in order
to force the defendant to plead guilty. None of these reasons, however, can
qualify as legitimate case strategy requiring judicial deference. Indeed, most
courts seem to adopt such an approach for misadvice situations even where
239
they do not explicitly apply a per se rule.
As for the failure to advise, Paredez stands alone in using a per se rule.
The court's position is not, however, indefensible, particularly with respect
to such a severe consequence as deportation. In practice, it means that even
if a defense attorney were to offer a strategic reason for failing to warnsuch as the need to focus on other, more pressing aspects of the case-it
would be irrelevant, and it would still be deemed unreasonable behavior.
What makes this controversial is that some attorneys might decide that they

233. Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
234. Id. at 689-90.
235. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
236. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 804.
237. Id. at 805.
238. Id. at 801.
239. In Roberti v. State, the court held that "[a]ffirmative misadvice about even a collateral
consequence of a plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which
to withdraw the plea." Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). It then
remanded for an evidentiary hearing at which Roberti could demonstrate that there was
misadvice and that he would not have pleaded no contest (tantamount to a guilty plea) with
proper advice. It thus appears that all Roberti had to show was the fact of misadvice, and not the
further showing that misadvice in his particular case demonstrated unreasonable attorney
behavior. On remand, however, the court denied Roberti's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
See supra note 66 (stating the same).
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do not know enough about, say, immigration law to undertake advisement
and thus they remain silent. Under Paredez this is no excuse, implying that
counsel can either educate himself or herself about the applicable
immigration consequences or consult counsel with expertise. In addition, a
defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea based on either a failure to warn
or misadvice will still have to demonstrate prejudice. Although the harsh
nature of deportation may make this a somewhat less difficult task than
proving prejudice in other contexts, 240 courts will still take such factors as
family ties in the United States, length of residence, employment status, and
strength of the evidence in the criminal case into account in making such
24 1
prejudice determinations.
In short, like Padilla,Paredez uses some bright lines. However, they are
more doctrinally defensible and comprehensible. Paredez did not rule that
counsel must inform clients about every applicable collateral consequence
in every case. However, less than three years later, an intermediate New
Mexico appeals court extended both the duty to warn and to avoid
misadvice, as well as the per se unreasonableness rule, to the consequence of
sex-offender registration. 242 State v. Edwards set out two reasons for this
extension. First, registration is severe and can lead to "'employability
problems, harassment, stigma[,] ostracism, humiliation, and physical
harm."' 243 Second, registration and community notification are "'immediate
and automatic"' consequences of twelve enumerated sex-offense convictions
in New Mexico, which means that "counsel need only consult this list to
determine whether the defendant's plea will expose him or her to the
virtually certain consequence of sex offender registration." 244 On this point,
Edwards makes a better argument for the use of per se unreasonableness in
relation to registration warnings than Paredez makes for immigration
warnings. Immigration law is much more complex than registration law,
particularly in the way in which it interacts with state criminal law. The major
nuance with registration law is keeping up with any legislative amendments
which add crimes to a state's sex-offense list. Legislative amendments are
likely in the political climate surrounding these types of crimes, however this
nuance is not particularly complex. By contrast, there are many unsettled

240. See supra note 101 (discussing how proving prejudice is a formidable barrier for
individuals claiming ineffective assistance of counsel).
241.
See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that
defendant's behavior and her nine-year residency in the United States evidenced her clear
desire to avoid deportation, and that "the facts of the current case demonstrate [prejudice]
beyond peradventure").
242. See State v. Edwards, 157 P.3d 56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).
243. Id. at 63 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Druktenis, 86 P.3d 1050, 1061 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2004)).
244. Id. at 64 (quoting Duktenis, 86 P.3d at 1061).
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issues surrounding which state crimes qualify as deportable offenses under
federal immigration law.245
There are three approaches to counsel's informational duties with
respect to the consequences of guilty pleas: (1) the majority approach,
which accepts the collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misadvice
exception; (2) the Kentucky approach, which subsumes misadvice into the
collateral-consequences rule and finds both outside the scope of the Sixth
Amendment; and (3) the New Mexico approach, which imposes an
affirmative duty of accurate advice. The majority and Kentucky methods are
doctrinally flawed and raise serious issues about the troubling messages they
send to counsel. They either sanction silence or allow for misadvice
(intentionally, unintentionally, or negligently) about even the most severe
consequences. By contrast, the New Mexico cases (although not
uncontroversial in their per se approach) recognize that Strickland does
affirmatively require advice about a consequence when it would be
unreasonable to withhold it. The New Mexico approach thus requires
lawyers to educate themselves about consequences that would reasonably
matter to their clients and to share this knowledge as part of the counseling
they provide under the Sixth Amendment. Although this approach is not
currently representative of the manner in which other courts have
approached the issue, the Supreme Court will soon have the opportunity to
change this.
This Article claims that only a rule requiring full information about
serious, relevant consequences (collateral or otherwise) would advance the
values behind the constitutional requirement of knowing guilty pleas and
would avoid the disturbing incentives that the collateral-consequences rule
encourages-with and without an affirmative-misadvice exception. Only a
rule analyzing both counsel's failure to advise about collateral consequences
and counsel's affirmative misadvice about the same under the Supreme
Court's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel framework would be true to
Stricklands insistence on a review of the reasonableness of counsel's actions
(or lack thereof) under the particular circumstances of each case. 246 Under
245.

See, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 52-53 (2006). The Lopez court stated:
The [relevant immigration law] makes Lopez guilty of an aggravated felony if he
has been convicted of "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance ... including,"

but not limited to, "a drug trafficking crime (as defined in [federal law])." Lopez's
state conviction was for helping someone else possess cocaine in South Dakota,
which state law treated as the equivalent of possessing the drug, a state felony.
Mere possession is not, however, a felony under the federal [Controlled Substances
Act], although possessing more than what one person would have for himself will
support conviction for the federal felony of possession with intent to distribute.
Id. (citations omitted).
246. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("In any case presenting an
ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances.").
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this fact-sensitive framework, affirmative misadvice about material
consequences may always be unreasonable attorney behavior, but it cannot
be the case that the failure to advise about the same consequence will never
constitute such a violation.
B.

THE COSTS OF THE COLLA TERAL-CONSEQUENCES RULE AND THE AFIRMA TIVEMISADVICE EXCEPTION OUTWEIGH ANYPERCEIVED BENEFTS

The difficulties that riddle the current constitutional structure carry
significant costs, including the effect that the advocate's failure to inform
individuals about the true consequences that their guilty pleas have on that
individual, his family, and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. This
raises the question of whether the reasons for having a collateralconsequences rule-with or without an affirmative-misrepresentation
exception-outweigh the costs.
This section considers three potential rationales that could explain why
courts treat affirmative misrepresentations differently from a total failure to
warn about a collateral consequence. The first rationale looks at things from
the defendant's perspective and claims that misinformation runs more
directly to the "knowing and voluntary" nature of a guilty plea than a simple
lack of information. Second, although innocent people sometimes plead
guilty, they are even more likely to do so when their lawyer erroneously
informs them that a particular collateral consequence will not occur as a
result of their guilty plea. Third, the lack of a remedy for defendants when
an officer of the court makes an incorrect statement-particularly on a
matter that may be of critical importance to the defendant, even if it is
technically collateral-threatens the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system.
This section finds that the underlying principles of each rationale also
apply to many failures to disclose important collateral consequences. Careful
analysis thus demonstrates that each rationale for distinguishing between
silence and misadvice is problematic, causing the costs of a regime that
encourages silence about collateral consequences to outweigh any perceived
benefits.
1.

Effect on Defendants

One rationale for the misrepresentation exception is that erroneous
information has a different effect on defendants than lack of information.
Under this theory, a defendant does not plead "intelligently" when his
counsel misinforms him, and defense counsel does not act "effectively" when
she offers incorrect information about even a collateral consequence. 247 The
person will believe he is making an informed decision and avoiding the

247. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (describing the misrepresentation
exception).
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relevant collateral consequence, when in fact, the opposite may be true. This
rests on the premise that it is worse, from a defendant's perspective, to get
incorrect information than to get no information at all. While that may be
true in some cases, a total lack of knowledge about consequences that can
eclipse the penal sanction can often lead to the same (or a quite similar)
effect on a defendant.
A common example illustrates how a person without information can
sometimes be in the same position as the recipient of incorrect information.
In many instances, non-citizen defendants plead guilty to offenses which
make them mandatorily deportable and they do so without their attorney
counseling them regarding the potential immigration consequences. In this
absence of advice, the non-citizen might have: (1) known exactly what the
immigration consequences were, perhaps because he consulted an
immigration attorney, unbeknownst to his criminal defense lawyer; (2) had
some idea that immigration consequences were possible but no clear
understanding of whether they would actually come to pass under the
particular circumstances of the plea bargain; (3) been completely unaware
of any immigration consequences and possibly under the natural
assumption that his defense attorney had told him about all of the serious
consequences of the plea when they discussed its pros and cons; or (4) had
the mistaken belief, from a source other than defense counsel, that there
would be no immigration consequences under the plea bargain. Under the
first scenario, and arguably under the second, the guilty plea in the absence
of warnings from the criminal defense attorney is knowing and voluntary.
However, if under these same two scenarios the non-citizen's attorney
incorrectly told him that no immigration consequences would flow from his
plea, this ineffective assistance of counsel would render the plea unknowing.
Under the third and fourth scenarios, the non-citizen feels the same effectan uninformed guilty plea leading to deportation-whether counsel
remained silent or misadvised that deportation would not follow. 248
Another example illustrates how counsel's silence about a collateral
consequence can actualiy be affirmatively misleading. Imagine that an
individual has decided to plead guilty to a sex crime in Minnesota and will
serve a state-prison term. Under that state's criminal procedure rules, the
judge must warn the person that for "most sex offenses, a mandatory period
of conditional release will be imposed to follow any executed prison
sentence, and violating the terms of that conditional release may increase
the time the defendant serves in prison." 249 No one in this hypothetical,
248. Another possibility is that a person pleads guilty without either defense counsel or the
court telling him anything about the consequence, yet does so because he wants the plea
bargain despite any collateral consequences. Here, however, the defendant would not be able
to make out the prejudice prong of the two-part ineffective-assistance test. Thus, this defendant
would not be able to later withdraw the plea.
249.

MINN. R.CRIM.P. 15.01(10)(d).
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however, has warned that Minnesota also has a law allowing for the
indefinite civil commitment of "sexually dangerous persons" or persons with
a "sexual psychopathic personality" after completion of any sentence of
imprisonment for a criminal conviction. 250 In other words, if the individual
met the standards under the civil-commitment act he would go directly from
state prison to a "secure treatment facility." 251 That individual would not, as
the judge had told him, go from prison to mandatory conditional release in
the community.
Both the immigration and civil-commitment examples show the
problem with a categorical approach that draws a bright line between direct
and collateral consequences. The reality is much more nuanced, and thus
much more suited to Strickland's two-part analysis for ineffective assistance.
In some cases involving failures to warn or misadvice about immigration
consequences, courts seem to assume that non-citizens are aware of the
possibility of deportation based on a criminal conviction. 25 2 The argument
could be made that the uninformed defendant acts in a system where
ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse,2 53 and thus the misinformed
defendant is in a different position, having been given affirmative misadvice.
However, the well-established mistake-of-law rule relates to substantive
criminal liability and does not apply in the pre-plea-information context.
This context, rather, is governed by norms which require that guilty pleas be
knowing, voluntary, and taken with the effective assistance of counsel. It is
for this reason that due process, the right to effective assistance, and state
and federal laws governing guilty-plea procedures require that an attorney
(and, in some instances, the court) make a defendant aware-and not
simply leave him to figure out on his own by reading the statutes-of such
things as the maximum penalty for the crime. 254 Thus, while this assumption
about the relatively well-publicized consequence of deportation may well be
faulty, 255 worse yet is the assumption that individuals charged with crimes
250. MINN STAT. §253B.185 (2008); see also id. §253B.02(18b)-(18c) (defining,
respectively, "sexually psychopathic personality" and "sexually dangerous person").
251. See id. § 253B.02(18a) (defining "secure treatment facility").
252. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) ("[A]lien defendants considering
whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of
their convictions." (footnote omitted)).
253.
See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) ("The general rule that ignorance
of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the

American legal system.").
254. See United States v. Rumery, 698 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacating defendant's
conviction after he pleaded guilty when his lawyer advised him that he faced a maximum of

thirty years in prison when in fact the maximum penalty was five years).
255.

See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; 'This Has Got Me in Some Kind of Whirlwind,' N.Y.

TiES (N.Y. ed.), Jan. 8, 2000, at A13 (describing Mary Anne Gehris's surprise upon learning
that she faced deportation for an old misdemeanor conviction); see also supra note 245 and
accompanying text (describing the complex nature of determination when federal deportation
law applies to state criminal conviction).
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(and even most of the public, for that matter) are aware of the plethora of
potential collateral consequences of criminal convictions.256
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the problem of failing to consider
silence and misinformation from the defendant's perspective than the
context of minor adjudications. As the prosecution of misdemeanors and
other minor offenses has steadily risen, 257 the list of collateral consequences
has also grown to apply to many convictions on minor charges. For example,
a lawful permanent resident of the United States may face mandatory
deportation for an old misdemeanor conviction, despite having lived in the
U.S. for many years with strong family ties.2 58 In such a case, and in many
cases, the collateral consequence is what matters most from the defendant's
perspective. Yet defendants often enter guilty pleas to minor offenses with

256. See, e.g., Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 434 (D. Mass. 1996) (rejecting a plaintiffs
argument that, among other things, sex-offender "registration is punitive when it is required of
juveniles who were promised confidentiality and who were not told at the time of the plea of
the possibility that their records could be used by enforcement officials in the future").
These assumptions are exacerbated in the context of "no contest" and Alford pleas. In
the former, the individual is convicted of the charge and sentenced accordingly without having
to admit guilt to the underlying offense. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.02(5)
(Vernon 2006) (noting how the legal effect of a plea of nolo contendere "shall be the same as that
of a plea of guilty, except that such plea may not be used against the defendant as an admission
in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is
based"). In the latter, the person may plead guilty while claiming innocence, so long as there is
a strong factual basis for the allegations beneath the conviction. See North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (holding that because the evidence "substantially negated" the
defendant's claim of innocence, it was not a constitutional error for the judge to accept the
guilty plea). In both categories of pleas, the defendant is even more likely to assume that the
resulting conviction would not lead to collateral consequences, since all parties involved in the
plea have agreed that he does not have to say that he committed the crime but instead only
state that he is pleading guilty. Yet these pleas can lead to any number of collateral
consequences. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.912(2) (2008) (including nolo contendere pleas in
Florida's Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act's definition of
"convicted of a sexually violent offense"). For example, Ronald Roberti was allowed to seek
withdrawal of his no-contest plea only because his lawyer misrepresented the Florida civilcommitment-act consequence to him. Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001). If defense counsel had remained silent about commitment, then Roberti would have
been stuck with his plea, despite the fact that he might quite reasonably have assumed that a nocontest plea would mean that the state could not use the plea against him in other
circumstances. That assumption might have been even more likely in a case where the
defendant entered an Alford plea, and affirmatively insisted upon his innocence while making
the strategic decision to plead guilty.
257. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 271, 272 (2006) (describing the rise
in
misdemeanor and low-level offense prosecutions in several major urban areas but questioning
the efficacy of such policies).
258. See Lewis, supra note 255 (describing the case of a thirty-four-year-old Georgia woman
living in the United States since she arrived from Germany as a child, whose husband and
severely disabled son are both American citizens, facing deportation for a hair-pulling incident
for which she received probation and a suspended jail sentence more than a decade earlier); see
alsosupra note 2 (defining "lawful permanent resident").
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little time to consult defense counsel, sometimes after only a few minutes of
consultation at the first court appearance, 259 or even without an attorney at
all. 26 ° All parties might assure the defendant that he will be released from
jail with only a misdemeanor conviction, yet never mention (or even know)
that the particular conviction will lead to automatic deportation. Regardless,
' 26 1
courts deem such pleas "knowing" and such counseling "effective."
The distinction between the effect on defendants from lack of
information and erroneous information is problematic because it privileges
defendants who know enough about the potential collateral consequences
related to their case (or have friends or family members who know enough)
to ask defense counsel about it. For the most part, only those who know to
ask about collateral consequences will benefit from the affirmative-misadvice
exception, by eliciting either correct information about the consequence
(and making an informed decision about what to do) or misadvice with the
subsequent right to withdraw the plea. Many defendants-indeed, many
attorneys, even those in criminal practice or on the bench-remain unaware
of the myriad and growing collateral consequences that could flow from a
conviction. Defendants unfamiliar with the United States's legal culture,
with poor cognitive skills or education, or who cannot afford counsel on
collateral issues, are all at a disadvantage. 262 This is especially true in lowlevel cases or with either recently enacted or obscure consequences, such as
civil commitment based on a sex-offense conviction. 263 Simply because they
259.

See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 94, at 16 (noting the problem of "meet 'em

and plead 'em" lawyers for indigent defendants).
260. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 21 (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/
(noting,
in the
indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission-report06.pdf
section reviewing New York State's town and village courts, that "the Commission was alarmed,
not only by the vast disparity in these courts with respect to when the assignment of counsel is
made, but also by the numerous outright denials of the right to assigned counsel itself").
261. See, e.g., People v. Clark, No. 2000KN067225, 2007 WL 328841, at *2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Feb. 5, 2007) (rejecting Clark's motion to vacate his two misdemeanor drug convictions
following guilty pleas, one taken the day after arrest and the other taken a month after arrest).
262. See Francis, supra note 102, at 726 (noting that failure to require counsel specifically to
advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty would "place[] an
affirmative duty to discern complex legal issues on a class of clients least able to handle that
duty").

263. This should not excuse an attorney's ignorance of collateral consequences. There are
a number of defender offices that conduct continuing training on various collateral
consequences. See, e.g., GA. PUB. DEFENDER STANDARDS, supra note 114. However, many indigent
defendants are represented not by an established public defender's office, but instead by
private attorneys paid by the government at a fixed hourly rate to handle such cases (sometimes
with a cap on total compensation). See Adam Liptak, Public Defenders Get Better Marks on Salary,
N.Y. TIMES,July 14, 2007, at Al ("[M]ost indigent defendants are not represented by staff public
defenders at the [state] trial level."). These attorneys do not work in one office with centralized
training; indeed, they often have no mandated training at all beyond any continuing-legaleducation requirements imposed by their respective licensing body. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 1500.1-26 (2007) (codifying New York's continuing-legal-education
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did not know enough to ask (and were not "lucky" enough to receive
erroneous advice), these defendants would be unable to withdraw the plea
264
that led to the undesirable consequence.
These same realities support the need for a duty to warn about serious
consequences of guilty pleas. More than seventy-five percent of individuals
charged with crimes qualify as indigent for the purpose of having counsel
assigned to them at no cost; 2 65 these individuals are not likely to have the
funds available to hire a private attorney on "collateral" matters. 266 There
are few avenues for indigent clients to receive legal assistance in these
267
matters, as the right to counsel does not extend to most civil cases.
Underfunded offices, such as Legal Services, often have long waiting lists
268
and provide representation only in certain circumstances.
It is only in the extreme circumstance of affirmative misrepresentation
on a serious collateral consequence that most courts have been willing to
face what every defendant knows: that he needed information about that
consequence before taking the plea and that, if he had full information, he
either would not have taken the plea, would have worked with his attorney
to secure a different plea offer that avoided the consequence, or would have
taken the plea anyway but with knowledge that the consequence could or

requirements). This is only to say that defense counsel are often not required to learn about
collateral consequences. It does not mean that they cannot learn about them through local
trainings or the many electronically available manuals on the topic. See generally LEGAL ACTION
CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY (2004), available at http://www.lac.org/
roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LACPrintReport.pdf;
Reentry Net, Find Out About
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Charges, Proceedings, and Convictions in Your State,
http://www.reentry.net/library/attachment.156819 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
264.
Under the current collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misadvice exception
approach in most jurisdictions, it is not clear whether a defendant must have affirmatively
inquired about the collateral consequence prior to receiving erroneous information to come
under the exception. The cases analyzing misadvice often do not specify whether or not the
defendant made such inquiries. See generally Goodall v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir.

2000).
265.
See supra note 108 (citing studies finding high percentages of defendants in both the
state and federal criminal justice systems who qualify as indigent).
266. Immigration poses a somewhat unique circumstance, where many people do hire
someone to help them through the complex process. But often that person is not an attorney,
and, although some may provide quality advice and assistance, scams and fraud abound in this
industry. See Gary Rivlin, Dollars and Dreams: Immigrants as Prey, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/1 I /business/yourmoney/ lmigrate.html?page
wanted=1&_r=l.
267. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981) (balancing
presumption against any right to counsel in cases where the individual does not face loss of
personal freedom against the Court's three-element due-process test, and finding no right to
counsel in parental-termination case under particular facts presented).
268.
See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA (2d ed.
2007), availableat http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
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would come to pass. 269 The fact that courts do not recognize this need for
knowledge has led the lower courts to establish a constitutional distinction
between silence and misinformation which is based, at least in part, on a
failure to step into a defendant's shoes.
One court did step into those shoes. In Paredez, the New Mexico
Supreme Court "refuse [d] to draw a distinction between misadvice and nonadvice." 270 The court reasoned:
[I]n many cases, there will only be a tenuous distinction between
the two. Whether an attorney provides no advice regarding
immigration consequences or general advice that a guilty plea
"could," "may," or "might" have an effect on immigration status,
the consequence is the same: the defendant did not receive
271
information sufficient to make an informed decision to plead guilty.
Unfortunately, Paredez is one of the few cases to acknowledge that
272
failure to advise can have the same effect as misadvice.
2.

Collateral Consequences and Innocence

273

A second rationale for treating misrepresentation about collateral
consequences differently from silence is that misrepresentation may
contribute more to the phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty.
The argument is that incorrect advice about a particular collateral

269. It is important to note that rejecting a plea-bargain offer does not necessarily mean
there will be a trial. Defense counsel may convey the rejection to the prosecution only to receive
a better offer, or at least an offer that allows the defendant to avoid the undesirable
consequence. See Michael Pinard, An IntegratedPerspectiveon the CollateralConsequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced ly FormerlyIncarceratedIndividuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006).

Incorporating the collateral consequences and reentry components into [plea]
negotiations would allow defense attorneys to more accurately lay out both the

immediate and long-term effects of the particular disposition. Conveying this
information to prosecutors and courts would enable both entities to more fully

understand and appreciate these effects and would encourage them to calibrate
their positions accordingly.
Id. at 685.
270.
271.

State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004).
Paredez, 101 P.3d at 804-05 (emphasis added).

272. See supra note 47 (listing the New Mexico, Colorado, Ohio, and California courts that
have recognized the effect).
273. For the purposes of this section, "innocent" means: (1) totally innocent of the charges
(for example, there was a mistaken identification so that the wrong person was charged), or (2)
innocent of the crime charged or top counts even if guilty of some other, lower-level, crime (for

example, guilty of drug possession but not of sale). For a definition of "claims of innocence,"
see Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1629, 1633 (2008) (dividing
"innocence claims into three basic categories: (1) substantial claims; (2) outcome-determinative

claims; and (3) inconclusive claims" and noting that "[t]hese categories reflect a spectrum
based on the varying degrees to which the new evidence of innocence ... may undermine the
evidence that was introduced at the criminal trial").
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consequence weighs heavily on the scale of plea-bargain considerations. It
might encourage an innocent defendant to plead guilty under the mistaken
belief that the particular consequence will not apply. As one court noted, "It
can readily be imagined that some resident aliens might prefer to avoid even
the risk of deportation rather than stand trial for crimes of which they
274
believed themselves innocent."
Guilty pleas are constitutionally permissible and historically entrenched
in our criminal justice system.2 75 Yet innocent people sometimes plead
guilty,2 76 just as innocent people sometimes confess to crimes they did not
commit, 277 and are sometimes convicted after trial. The Supreme Court

acknowledged this fact in holding that guilty pleas pass due-process muster
so long as they are entered into knowingly and voluntarily:
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for
the innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently
employed in this country are necessarily valid in all respects. This
mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the
court or to the jury. 278

274. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
275. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1978) ("Whatever might be the situation in
an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are
important components of this country's criminal justice system."). See generally MICHAEL
MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY (2005)

(chronicling the American criminal justice system's transition from one of primarily jury trials
to one of primarily plea bargaining). Plea bargaining, however, is not without its critics. See, e.g.,
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979-80 (1992) ("[P]lea
bargaining seriously impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in
accurate separation of the guilty from the innocent.").
276. Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REv. L. & SOC. Sc., 173, 181 (Dec.
2008); Chris Conway, The DNA 200, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2 0 0 7 /05/20/weekinreview/20conway.html?scp=1&sq=DNA+200++Chris+Conway&st-nyt
(citing the Innocence Project finding that four percent of the 200 DNA exonerations between
1989 and 2007 involved criminal defendants who pleaded guilty).
277. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confession in America, CHAMPION, Dec.
2007, at 30, 31 ("[Flalse confessions are ... not an anomaly but a systemic feature of American
criminal justice."); Jodi Wilgoren, Confession Had His Signature; DNA Did Not, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2002, at Al (describing a Michigan case where a man signed a confession yet DNA proved
him innocent). False confessions continue to be a leading cause of miscarriages of justice in
America. In six separate studies of documented false confessions, Professor Richard Leo found
that "police-induced false confessions continue to occur regularly and 'are of sufficient
magnitude to demand attention.'" RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN

JUSTICE 244 (2008). One of the studies found that, of the 200 DNA exonerations documented
by the Innocence Project between 1989 and 2007, "[a]t least sixteen percent of these wrongful
convictions were caused by false confession." Id. However, only four percent of those
convictions involved actual guilty pleas, meaning the others involved only an earlier, pre-plea
confession followed by conviction after trial. Conway, supranote 276.
278. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (10th Cir. 1970). For an extensive
exploration of the various systemic incentives that lead innocent defendants to plead guilty and
the roles that prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges play in securing such erroneous
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Indeed, a defendant can plead guilty while insisting upon his innocence; the
279
Supreme Court has upheld the validity of so-called Alford pleas.

The numerous recent, highly publicized exonerations based on DNA
evidence demonstrate beyond question that innocent people sometimes
plead guilty. Since DNA was first used to expose a wrongful conviction in

convictions, see F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargainingand Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYUJ. PUB. L. 189, 191-93
(2002). See also Michael 0. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal
Courts, 89 HARV. L. REv. 293, 309 (1975) ("[P]ressures to plead guilty have been used to secure
convictions that could not otherwise be obtained.").
279. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding that it does not violate
due process when trial judges accept a guilty plea from a defendant who continues to insist
upon his innocence, so long as there is a factual basis for the plea). Anyone who has spent
significant time practicing in the criminal justice system is aware that courts often allow
defendants to plead guilty to a charge just seconds after protesting their innocence or "messing
up" their plea allocution, often with a short "consultation" with defense counsel to clear up the
"confusion." For example, consider the following excerpt from Alford:
After giving his version of the events of the night of the murder, Alford stated:
"I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said there is too much
evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for the other man. We never
had an argument in our life and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't
they would gas me for it, and that is all."
In response to questions from his attorney, Alford affirmed that he had consulted
several times with his attorney and with members of his family and had been
informed of his rights if he chose to plead not guilty. Alford then reaffirmed his
decision to plead guilty to second-degree murder:
"Q [by Alford's attorney]. And you authorized me to tender a plea of guilty to
second degree murder before the court?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And in doing that, that you have again affirmed your decision on that point?
"A. Well, I'm still pleading that you all got me to plead guilty. I plead the other way,
circumstantial evidence; that the jury will prosecute me on--on the second. You
told me to plead guilty, right. I don't-I'm not guilty but I plead guilty."
Id. at 28 n.2; see also John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas:
Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 95 (1977) (noting that one
purpose of the requirement that the court establish a factual basis for a guilty plea before
accepting it is to "protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an
understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not
actually fall within the charge"). Despite this constitutional stamp of approval, many
jurisdictions remain uncomfortable with the idea of such pleas, such that as of 2002 only
thirteen states allowed Alford pleas. Hessick & Saujani, supra note 278, at 198. Hessick and
Saujani stated:
Since the Alford decision, some courts have remained averse to the idea. The Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have upheld the Alford
plea standard; only thirteen states have applied the standard. The U.S. Attorney's
Office permits Alford pleas only with permission from a higher authority, and the
military tribunals ban it outright.
Id. (citations omitted).
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1989, 232 people have been exonerated through DNA evidence. 2 80 Of the
first 200 exonerees, about four percent had pleaded guilty and one-quarter
281
Of
had falsely confessed or admitted to crimes that they did not commit.
course most cases do not involve DNA, and many who study wrongful
convictions agree that wrongful convictions that actually result in DNA
282
exonerations "reflect only the tip of a very large iceberg."
Since this nation's criminal justice system is built around the values of
convicting the guilty and not the innocent, rules that further avoidance of
wrongful conviction are critical.2 83 Yet the criminal justice system has built-in
incentives against going to trial that can lead even an innocent person to
plead guilty. 284 To offer an over-simplified view (but sufficient for the

280.
Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).

http://www.

281.
See Conway, supra note 276. There are well-known examples of false confessions, with
the recent spate of DNA exonerations starkly illustrating the phenomenon. See, e.g., Tina Kelley,
Charges Dropped for Man Imprisoned 19 Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at B3 (describing how
DNA refuted the signed confession of Byron Halsey, a man with a sixth-grade education and
severe learning disabilities, admitting to killing his two children); Bruce Tomaso & David
McLemore, Bush Spares Lucas from Death Penalty; Governor Commutes Sentence to Life, Cites Doubts
Over Guilt, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at IA (describing then-Governor of Texas
George W. Bush's commutation-despite Henry Lee Lucas's detailed videotaped confession,
which the prosecution played for the jury that sentenced him to death-after post-conviction
evidence showed Lucas was 1000 miles away from murder scene).
282. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 291 (noting how "DNA evidence exists in only a small minority of
all cases-and is preserved and available for post-conviction testing in an even smaller
proportion of cases," and how "innocence is so very difficult to prove postconviction without
DNA"); see also Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1559 ("It is fair to say
that the proven cases of actual innocence are just the tip of the innocence iceberg, so to speak."
(footnote omitted)).
283. The value of exonerating the innocent is high in our criminal justice system, since it
both avoids miscarriages ofjustice and can lead to the conviction of the actual guilty personsomething that will not happen if an innocent person ends the case by pleading guilty.
Reinvestigation of a case will likely only happen if there is strong, affirmative evidence of the
defendant's innocence, and even then there may be great resistance. See, e.g., Daniel Medwed,
The Zeal Deal ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125,
138-41 (2004) (discussing the "conviction psychology" and identifying the institutional
atmosphere and cognitive biases that prosecutors face in dealing with post-conviction
innocence claims); Amaris Elliot-Engel, DNA to Enter Murder Case, CITIZEN (Auburn, N.Y.), Apr.
21, 2006, available at http://www.auburnpub.com/articles/2006/04/21/news/local_news/news
03.txt (describing how lead prosecutor, when faced with possibility of new DNA evidence that
could exonerate Roy Brown, stated that other evidence in the case against Brown still held up
and noted how "'[tihe absence of someone's DNA does not automatically exonerate
someone'"); Ctr. on Wrongful Conviction, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Kirk Bloodsworth,
http://www.law.northwester.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/mdBloodsworthSummar
y.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (describing how it took authorities a decade after
Bloodsworth's release from prison to run DNA evidence that had exonerated him through a
national database, and how when this was finally done, it linked a man who had been in same
prison as Bloodsworth to the crime).
284.

See generally Hessick & Saujani, supra note 278, at 197-206.
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purpose of this discussion), the tipping point towards pleading will be the
moment when, in the defendant's calculation, the offer on the table
outweighs the risk of proceeding to trial. As Professor Stephen Schulhofer
stated in one of his many critiques of the plea-bargain system, "[T]he
defendant, who seeks to minimize punishment, will be better off accepting a
plea offer if the contemplated punishment is lower than the anticipated post
285
trial sentence, discounted by the possibility of acquittal."
To complete this equation, it is necessary to add any applicable
collateral consequences into the definition of "contemplated punishment."
This is particularly true for a collateral consequence that matters a lot to a
particular defendant, or for a collateral consequence that overshadows the
direct consequences of the particular plea. In a reasonable defendant's
calculation, the potential jail or prison time, the fine, or any other penal
sanction is not the only cost. Deportation, involuntary commitment, sexoffender registration and loss of housing-among other consequences-all
impose significant burdens that must be added to the cost-benefit
286
analysis.
Since protection against wrongful conviction is a central value, the
answer is not a misrepresentation exception but instead an affirmative duty
to warn defendants about serious collateral consequences. The innocent
defendant who wants to go to trial but has reasonable concerns about
wrongful conviction may well choose trial-however risky-if he knows that
287
he definitely, or likely, faces a serious collateral consequence if convicted.
285. Schulhofer, supra note 275, at 1980. The equation is of course more complex than it
first appears. For example, "[s]cholars have posited that the innocent defendant is inherently
more risk averse than the criminal because a criminal was willing to risk breaking the law in the
first place." Hessick & Saujani, supra note 278, at 201 (citing various examples). In addition,
there are many other factors that might play a role in the decision-making process for a
particular defendant, including pressure from family members or friends, unwillingness to serve
any time in prison whatever the risk of loss at trial, or mental-health issues that may inhibit
rational judgment. Still, a cost-benefit analysis of a plea offer is an integral part of the dialogue
between defendant and counsel and is a useful starting point for any discussion about plea
bargaining.
286. So, of course, do the less tangible collateral consequences, including days spent in
court continuing to litigate the case (and thus days of work lost, or childcare to cover). See
generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT 239-40 (1979) (finding that a sample study of defendants indicated that the
total income lost due to court appearances was five times the amount collected in fines for
those cases); see also K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of
Aggressive Misdemeanor Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 292 (2009) ("Many of
these costs are externalized, born by individual arrestees, their families, their communities, and
the larger community of taxpayers to the extent that arrests and criminal records lead to
further arrests, incarceration, or un(der)employment. Other costs are borne directly by the
system."); Pager, supra note 26 (discussing causal relationship between a criminal record and
employment outcomes).
287. Of course going to trial is not a sure protection against conviction of the innocent. See
Gross, supra note 276, at 181 ("[One 2005 study] found 20 individual exonerations in which the
underlying convictions were based on guilty pleas, or about 6% of the 340 cases they analyzed.
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To further explore the problems with this third rationale for valuing
misinformation over silence, consider three scenarios in which the
defendant: (1) is affirmatively given incorrect information that a serious
collateral consequence will not come to pass; (2) knows that the
consequence is out there but assumes, based on counsel's silence on such a
serious issue, that it will not come to pass; or (3) is not aware of the
consequence at all. Under scenarios 1 and 2, the defendant affirmatively
believes that the consequence is not a possibility. Silence in scenario 2 has
exactly the same effects on the innocent defendant as the misrepresentation
in 1; both remove a major incentive against pleading guilty.
Scenario 3 is somewhat different, because a defendant cannot
consciously weigh a collateral consequence that he does not even know
exists. However, the reason to allow withdrawal of any plea based on
misrepresentation (under an "innocence" rationale) is that full, correct
information about all serious consequences would have a positive effect on
the avoidance of guilty pleas by innocent defendants. This reasoning applies
equally to scenario 3, since the innocent defendant, had he known about the
potential for involuntary commitment, would weigh that fact and be much
288
more likely to insist upon a trial.

If knowledge about serious collateral consequences advances the goal of
having only guilty people plead guilty, then it is particularly true in the
context of minor charges. When the direct criminal penalty is low, even
innocent defendants may find it easy to ignore that penalty in favor of a
quick disposition of the case. 289 Indeed, "[m]any courts refuse to give
collateral estoppel effect to relatively minor convictions such as traffic
offenses or misdemeanors because of the limited incentive even innocent
defendants have to contest them." 290 While it is certainly encouraging that
some courts recognize the fact that guilty pleas to minor charges are not

This is a startlingly low proportion in a system in which 95% of felony convictions are obtained
by guilty plea.").
288. There is a fourth scenario that, although perhaps less likely than the others, is
nevertheless worthy of consideration. Here, counsel informs his or her client that a conviction
after trial on the crimes charged will lead to a collateral consequence and that a guilty plea to
reduced charges will avoid the consequence. Counsel was wrong, however, and in fact, neither
conviction would lead to the consequence. Silence in this scenario, ifaccompanied by the
defendant's assumption that there was no collateral consequence, would actually be more
advantageous for the defendant trying to weigh the true costs and benefits of a plea versus a
trial, whereas misadvice would put a heavy finger on the plea scale.
289. See generally FEELEY, supra note 286, at 186-87 (noting how many defendants charged
with minor crimes choose to plead guilty once they realize "how much it will cost them to
pursue their claim of innocence," especially in light of the fact that many who plead guilty will
not receive a jail sentence). Of course, even in some serious cases, the collateral consequence
outweighs the direct penalty. Thus, a defendant may well consider involuntary commitment or
deportation harsher than a number of years in prison.
290. Chin & Holmes, supra note 49, at 740 (citing various articles arguing that innocent
defendants frequently plead guilty).
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always reliable, refusing to give the pleas collateral-estoppel effect is an ex
post facto reaction that provides protection only in the later civil case. It does
nothing to solve the core problem, which is that innocent defendants
sometimes plead guilty in minor cases. Surely, if courts recognize the
reliability problems in the civil context, where only money is at stake, they
should also recognize the problem in the criminal context, where liberty,
the ability to work and to vote, and other basic rights are at stake.
Another reason that it is important to warn people about collateral
consequences before they plead guilty to a minor charge is that indigent
defendants (even innocent ones) will be hard-pressed to find counsel to
handle a collateral attack on a conviction based on a failure to warn or even
a misrepresentation. There is no federal constitutional right to postconviction representation beyond the first appeal, 291 and the legal
community has understandably focused its pro bono efforts for potentially
innocent defendants on those individuals on death row or serving extremely
292
long sentences.
Nor is full knowledge about serious consequences likely to cause a
logjam in the system, with large percentages of defendants refusing to accept
plea bargains because of those consequences. 29 3 First, many defendants do
not face collateral consequences that outweigh the criminal sanction. For
example, while bars to employment are a serious and growing problem for
individuals convicted of crimes, 294 most defendants will not risk conviction
at trial, with its likelihood of a much harsher sentence than for a guilty plea,
based on the prospect of future employment difficulties.
Second, in more serious criminal cases where prosecutors have strong
evidence of guilt, most defendants with no viable defense will accept a plea
bargain with a reduced sentence rather than go to trial on a hopeless case
and face the higher sentence at the end of it, regardless of the collateral
consequence. Indeed, that defendant may seek a disposition which takes the
291. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (stating that the Due Process Clause does not
guarantee the right to counsel for discretionary appeals).
292. See, e.g.,
ABA, Death Penalty Representation Project, http://www.abanet.org/
deathpenalty/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) ("Our goals are to raise awareness about the lack of
representation available to death row inmates, to address this urgent need by recruiting
competent volunteer attorneys and to offer these volunteers training and assistance."); see also
Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of CapitalPost Conviction Counsel:
Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counse4 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 63-65
(noting how, despite the fact that federal constitutional law does not guarantee counsel beyond
the first appeal even in capital cases, not all states with a death penalty provide a mandatory
fight to counsel for capital defendants for post-conviction proceedings).
293. Although, even if it did, that would be a weak argument against full information. If
society supports numerous, harsh collateral consequences, then they should not be a secret.
Indeed, the rule is not that judges and lawyers cannot inform defendants, but only that they need
not inform them, at least not under constitutional norms.
294. See supra text accompanying note 25 (discussing the employment consequences of a
criminal sanction).
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fact of the collateral consequence into account in determining an
appropriate criminal sanction. It is the individual facing weak charges
against him who is most likely to insist upon a trial. 295 This is precisely the
person who should be going to trial (or have the charges against him
dismissed).
The argument could be made that full disclosure about collateral
consequences will deter even guilty people from pleading guilty, since they
will now be aware of the added range of formerly hidden consequences.
This argument against transparency seems to accept that the aggregated
direct and collateral punishments may be disproportionately high for a
particular conviction, but that knowledge of these heightened sanctions will
hold up even the "right" guilty pleas. The answer is that there should not be
such severe collateral consequences if they are so harsh that they will
interfere with orderly plea bargains in the correct cases.
A duty to warn about collateral consequences would help protect
against innocent people pleading guilty. While misinformation is certainly
troubling in the innocence context, equally troubling is the permission the
collateral-consequences rule gives to judges, defense attorneys, and
prosecutors to remain silent. A constitutional duty to warn about such
consequences will increase reliability in the plea process as pressure is
brought to bear where it is needed the most, namely against taking the quick
and convenient plea, where the person might be innocent.
3.

Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System

A third rationale for the affirmative-misrepresentation exception is the
belief that it helps protect the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. It is
troublesome when defense counsel, the judge, or the prosecutor incorrectly
tells a defendant that he need not be concerned with a particular

295.

As the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws commented:
[B]ecause the [collateral] sanctions typically apply to a conviction by plea or jury
verdict, pleading not guilty is not a means for a guilty person to avoid collateral
sanctions. It is reasonable to assume that the largest group of people who will plead
not guilty when they otherwise would have pleaded guilty will be those who have a
defensible case, but planned to plead guilty under the misapprehension that a
criminal conviction would have little effect.

See UNIF. ACT ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTIONS § 5 cmt. (Draft 2008), available
at

http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2008-amdraft.pdf

(noting

but

disagreeing with the argument that "[o]ne possible objection to advisement about applicable
collateral sanctions is that if defendants actually know about the dozens or hundreds of negative
legal effects of a criminal conviction, many will refuse to plead guilty"). But seeJulian A. Cook,
III, All Aboard: The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Railroadingof Criminal Defendants, 75 U.

COLO. L. REv. 863, 899 (2004) ("[Dlefendant ignorance about the realities of the plea process
is necessary if the current plea structure is to maintain its vibrancy, for if defendants truly
comprehended the process and its attendant consequences, the efficiency of the guilty plea
system would likely be compromised.").

95 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[2009]

consequence coming to pass should he plead guilty. This is not necessarily
because the misinformation might undermine the validity of the admission
of guilt that follows (although this may also be true), but rather because
there is something unseemly about a court process that fails to correct
erroneous information. Sanctioned misadvice undermines confidence in
outcomes and raises concerns about procedural fairness and humandignitarian interests, and it does so in a criminal justice system that is already
fraught with legitimacy problems.
The concern that misrepresentations will undermine public confidence
in the system is valid. The argument can be made that there is a greater blow
to legitimacy with an affirmative act (of providing misinformation about a
collateral consequence) than with an absence of action (the failure to warn
about a collateral consequence). Certainly, misinformation is more starkly
illustrative of the problem than failure to inform. However, a system that
pretends knowledge of collateral consequences simply does not matter to
defendants considering plea bargains is a system that undermines public
confidence. Likewise, a system that assumes defendants "know" about such
consequences (because they are published laws or regulations which are
theoretically publicly accessible), 296 or which places the burden on people
charged with crimes to discover the existence and potential applicability of
any such consequences, undermines public confidence.
Public confidence is particularly vulnerable at a time when the
collateral consequences of criminal convictions are harsher, more
numerous, and (due to technological advances allowing easy access to
criminal records and increased focus among employers, immigration
authorities, landlords, and others on even minor convictions) more likely to
affect convicted individuals. 297 For example, consider the perception of
legitimacy for a system that allows a defendant to plead guilty to a relatively
minor drug charge without knowing that this could result in the eviction of
his entire family from public housing, 298 or to plead to a misdemeanor
without knowing that the conviction will make him mandatorily
deportable. 299 If these defendants would not have taken such guilty pleas
had they known of the harsh consequences, or if they could have worked

296. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (pointing out why ignorance-of-law
concept does not apply to information about collateral consequences).
297. See generally PETERSILIA, supra note 24.
298. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002) (upholding the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's authority to evict tenants based on the drug
activity of any visitor, "regardless of whether the tenant knew, or had reason to know, of that
activity").
299. See, e.g., Lewis, sup-a note 255 (illustrating the injustice of losing one's home or ability
to live in what has become one's home country because of a minor conviction, and thus also
illustrating the unfairness of immigration and housing laws).
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with counsel to secure an alternative plea that allowed avoidance of the
consequence, the criminal justice system is undermined.
The intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and affirmativemisrepresentation exception encourages silence about information that is
critical to individuals facing criminal charges, and thus encourages poor
lawyering. When the rules regulating attorneys have this effect, the systemic
legitimacy problem rivals that of a system allowing for misinformation.
While there is some truth in the factual bases of these potential
rationales for the affirmative-misadvice exception, they ultimately make a
flawed distinction between lack of information and misinformation. The
misrepresentation exception is more appropriately explained by an
understandable discomfort when it comes to erroneous information about
increasingly harsh and wide-ranging collateral consequences of guilty pleas.
As the critique of the main rationales for the misrepresentation exception
makes clear, this discomfort is really one with the collateral-consequences
rule itself and not merely misinformation. This should lead to a reevaluation
of the current constitutional norms for information about collateral
consequences in the guilty-plea context.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the number and harshness of collateral consequences continues to
grow, the successful integration of individuals convicted of crimes while
burdened with civil liabilities is of major social and economic concern. For
these individuals, their families, and their communities, constitutional rules
that discourage information about the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions further exacerbate an already difficult situation. Under current
constitutional rules in almost all jurisdictions, a defendant who pleaded
guilty to criminal charges is actually better off-in terms of his ability to later
withdraw that plea-if his lawyer gave him erroneous advice about certain
consequences of that guilty plea than if the lawyer failed to advise him at all.
This affirmative-misadvice rule chastises lawyers who try but fail to correctly
advise and, combined with the collateral-consequences rule, effectively
encourages silence. One commentator aptly characterized the misadvice line
300
of cases as a "'don't ask-don't tell"' policy.
This Article does not argue that courts should simply reject the
affirmative-misadvice exception for the sake of doctrinal consistency.
Instead, it claims that the numerous ethical, practical and doctrinal
difficulties at the intersection of the exception and the rule should lead the
Supreme Court-when it decides Padilla--to reexamine the whole
collateral-consequences doctrine. While defendants who plead guilty after

300.

Francis, supra note 102, at 726.
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getting erroneous information about collateral consequences should be able
to withdraw their pleas, the rationales for such a remedy apply equally to the
failure to warn.
Thus the Court should breach the direct-collateral divide and move to
a requirement of full disclosure about serious or highly likely collateral
consequences prior to any guilty plea. Defense lawyers should have a
constitutional duty to accurately counsel their clients about any
consequence that is significant enough to factor into that client's decisionmaking process about whether to plead guilty. Recognizing such a duty in
the Sixth Amendment's right to the effective assistance of counsel will bring
the constitutional jurisprudence in line with the professional norms in this
area. It will also be true to the Supreme Court's fact-specific approach to
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance, by recognizing that the Sixth
Amendment does require advice when it would be unreasonable to withhold
it.

